

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

CROSS-NATIONAL SUMMARIES

NUMBER 27 OCTOBER 1983

JOHN CLELAND JANE VERRALL MARTIN VAESSEN

Preferences for the Sex of Children and their Influence on Reproductive Behaviour

INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE Permanent Office. Director: E. Lunenberg 428 Prinses Beatrixlaan, PO Box 950 2270 AZ Voorburg Netherlands

WORLD FERTILITY SURVEY Project Director: Halvor Gille 35–37 Grosvenor Gardens London SW1W 0BS, UK The World Fertility Survey (WFS) is an international research programme whose purpose is to assess the current state of human fertility throughout the world. This is being done principally through promoting and supporting nationally representative, internationally comparable, and scientifically designed and conducted sample surveys of fertility behaviour in as many countries as possible.

The WFS is being undertaken, with the collaboration of the United Nations, by the International Statistical Institute in co-operation with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. Financial support is provided principally by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and the United States Agency for International Development. Substantial support is also provided by the UK Overseas Development Administration.

For information on Country Reports, WFS publications, and WFS depository libraries, write to the Publications Office, International Statistical Institute, 428 Prinses Beatrixlaan, PO Box 950, 2270 AZ Voorburg, Netherlands. For information on the WFS generally, write to the Information Office, World Fertility Survey, International Statistical Institute, 35-37 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0BS, UK.

L'Enquête Mondiale sur la Fécondité (EMF) est un programme international de recherche dont le but est d'évaluer l'état actuel de la fécondité humaine dans le monde. Afin d'atteindre cet objectif, des enquêtes par sondage sur la fécondité sont mises en oeuvre et financées dans le plus grand nombre de pays possible. Ces études, élaborées et réalisées de façon scientifique, fournissent des données représentatives au niveau national et comparables au niveau international.

L'EMF est entreprise, en collaboration avec les Nations Unies, par l'Institut International de Statistique, qui coopère avec l'Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population. Le financement de ce programme est essentiellement assuré par le Fonds des Nations Unies pour les activités en matière de population et par l'Agence des Etats-Unis pour le développement international. Une contribution importante est aussi faite par le Département pour le développement des pays d'outre-mer du Royaume-Uni.

Pour toute information concernant les rapports d'enquêtes nationaux, les publications de l'EMF ou les bibliothèques dépositaires, écrire au Bureau des publications, Institut International de Statistique, 428 Prinses Beatrixlaan, BP 950, 2270 AZ Voorburg, Pays-Bas. Pour tous renseignements complémentaires sur l'EMF en général, écrire au Bureau d'information, Enquête Mondiale sur la Fécondité, Institut International de Statistique, 35-37 Grosvenor Gardens, Londres SW1W 0BS, Royaume-Uni.

La Encuesta Mundial de Fecundidad (EMF) es un programa internacional de investigación cuyo propósito es determinar el estado actual de la fecundidad humana en el mundo. Para lograr este objetivo, se están promoviendo y financiando encuestas de fecundidad por muestreo en el mayor número posible de países. Estas encuestas son diseñadas y realizadas científicamente, nacionalmente representativas y comparables a nivel internacional.

El proyecto está a cargo del Instituto Internacional de Estadística, contando con la colaboración de las Naciones Unidas y en cooperación con la Unión Internacional para el Estudio Científico de la Población. Es financiado principalmente por el Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para Actividades de Población y por la Agencia para el Desarrollo Internacional de los Estados Unidos. La Oficina Británica para el Desarrollo de Países Extranjeros proporciona también un gran apoyo financiero.

Puede obtenerse información sobre Informes de Países como otras publicaciones de la EMF y las bibliotecas depositarias, escribiendo a la Oficina de Publicaciones, Instituto Internacional de Estadística, Prinses Beatrixlaan 428, Casilla Postal 950, 2270 AZ Voorburg, Países Bajos. Si desea información de carácter general sobre la EMF, escriba a la Oficina de Información, Encuesta Mundial de Fecundidad, Instituto Internacional de Estadística, 35-37 Grosvenor Gardens, Londres SW1W 0BS, Reino Unido.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

CROSS-NATIONAL SUMMARIES

Preferences for the Sex of Children and their Influence on Reproductive Behaviour

Errata

Preferences for the Sex of Children and their Influence on Reproductive Behaviour

WFS Comparative Studies no 27

This errata slip is printed on gummed paper. The corrections may be affixed over the original figure titles.

- page 16 Figure 2 Difference in the percentage of women wanting no more children between those with an equal number of boys and girls and those with specified imbalanced family compositions (see page 15 for explanation)
- page 20 Figure 3 Difference in the percentage of women currently using contraception between those with an equal number of boys and girls and those with specified imbalanced family compositions
- page 24 Figure 4 Fertility rates (vertical axis) according to number of sons (horizontal axis) for specified family sizes

JOHN CLELAND JANE VERRALL MARTIN VAESSEN

WFS Central Staff

The recommended citation for this publication is:

Cleland, John, Jane Verrall and Martin Vaessen (1983). Preferences for the Sex of Children and their Influence on Reproductive Behaviour. *WFS Comparative Studies* no 27. Voorburg, Netherlands: International Statistical Institute.

Contents

| PRE | PREFACE | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| ACK | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | | | | | |
| 1 | INTRODUCTION | 7 | | | | |
| 1.1 1.2 | Background 'Methodology | 7 8 | | | | |
| 2 | FINDINGS | 10 | | | | |
| 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 | Stated preference for the sex of the next child Sex ratio of last wanted birth Self-declared propensity to cease childbearing Current use of contraception Recent fertility | 10 14 15 19 22 | | | | |
| 3 | SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION | 26 | | | | |
| REF | References | | | | | |
| App | APPENDIX A – DETAILED TABLES | | | | | |
| ТАВ | LES | | | | | |
| 1 | Preferences for the sex of the next child among currently married, fecund women who want another child, by number of living children | 11 | | | | |
| 2 | Preferences for the sex of the next child in selected countries among currently married, fecund women who want another child, by existing family size and composition | 13 | | | | |

- 3 Sex ratios of last wanted births compared to sex ratios of all preceding births, confined to currently married, fecund, non-pregnant women 14
- 4 The effect of composition on the stated desire to have no more children: observed levels of significance (p-values) for two models 18
- 5 The effect of composition on current use of contraception; observed levels of significance (p-values) for two models 22
- 6 The effect of composition on marital fertility in the five years preceding the survey: observed levels of significance (p-values) for two models 23
- 7 Summary of main results 26

FIGURES

- Percentage of women preferring a boy, a girl or undecided 12
- 2 Percentage of women wanting no more children 16

3

3 Percentage of women currently using contraception 20

4 Fertility rates 24

Preface

One of the main objectives of the WFS programme is the collection and dissemination of internationally comparable data on human fertility, obtained through nationally representative interview surveys carried out in a large number of countries. Many institutions and research workers at international and national levels are engaged in cross-national comparative analysis of the data collected. The WFS London headquarters also undertake comparative analysis such as cross-national summaries.

The cross-national summaries present basic results from WFS surveys in developing countries on a wide range of topics. These summaries are published in the WFS Comparative Studies series.

Several of the cross-national summaries are concerned solely with providing detailed and systematized information on the comparability, or lack thereof, of the field procedures, survey characteristics, questionnaire content and wording and content of the First Country Reports (*WFS Comparative Studies* nos 1–4, 5, which is in preparation, and 16). Such detailed appraisals constitute an essential reference base for anyone using WFS data for comparative analysis.

Other cross-national summaries present comparable results from as many surveys as possible on a wide range of specific topics. Each summary has, in addition to the tabular material, a brief accompanying text, which draws attention primarily to any non-comparability of the data and to any obvious interpretational pitfalls to which the tables may be subject. Furthermore, although these summaries are not intended to be analytic in their orientation, some brief highlighting of the major noteworthy differences and similarities is included.

A first group of topical cross-national summaries based upon data from 19 countries for which the First Country Report and standard recode tapes were available early in 1980 is near completion with the publication of twelve issues (*WFS Comparative Studies* nos 6-15, 17 and 19).

The present publication is issued in the series of a second group of cross-national summaries based generally upon data from 28 developing countries, with Africa being represented for the first time, and dealing with a further set of topics.

The cross-national summaries are intended to assist analysts and policy-makers by providing a ready tool for comparison of data between countries, but at the same time they draw attention to the limits, if any, of such comparability. It is intended in due course to update and rationalize issues in both groups of summaries so as to cover eventually all developing countries participating in the WFS programme.

> HALVOR GILLE Project Director

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Dr J. McDonald of WFS Central Staff for his generous assistance with statistical advice and programming.

,

1.1 BACKGROUND

The subject of parental attitudes and aspirations concerning the sex of children has attracted considerable analytical attention in the past few decades. An extensive review of findings may be found in Williamson (1976). This interest has been aroused mainly by evidence that these sex or gender preferences may sustain higher levels of childbearing than would be the case if the sex of children was a matter of indifference; this is so because couples may continue childbearing beyond their overall desired family size in order to achieve some favoured number or distribution of sons and daughters. Research interest has been heightened by the belief that routine and widespread pre-determination of the sex of a baby, either before conception or by selective termination of pregnancy, may become feasible in the future and by speculation as to the consequences of such an innovation.

In theory, parental preferences can take many possible forms. Among the more plausible are the desire for at least one child of each sex, the desire for a minimum number of children of a particular sex (eg at least two sons), or for an approximately equal number of sons and daughters. These and other possible desiderata may co-exist in a complex manner. Similarly, the possible origins of gender preferences are many and varied. They are often assumed to have an economic rationale. Particularly in patrilocal societies, a greater long-term economic return may be expected by parents from sons than from daughters. In societies with strongly defined sex differentiation of work, it is possible that sons may be considered more productive than daughters, or vice versa. Closely linked to these economic factors are considerations of security in old age and insurance against risk. To the extent that such protection is customarily expected from offspring of a particular sex, a parental imperative to bear children of that sex may result. Alternatively, the origins of gender preferences may lie in religious beliefs and observances; they may also be sought in systems of inheritance, lineage, bride-wealth or in psychological needs.

In this study no *a priori* assumptions are made about the nature or origins of sex preferences nor are complex behavioural models tested. The approach is essentially descriptive, the main aim being to identify the nature of preferences and to examine the relationship between composition of families and reproductive behaviour.

Until recently, most of the direct survey evidence concerning gender preferences came from questions on the total or additional number of children desired, followed by supplementary questions on the desired number of boys and girls. However, both at the individual and aggregate level, this measure of gender preference was found to be inadequate and cumbersome, because it was based on a simple first choice and because the issues of desired size and

desired sex composition were confounded. Subsequently, more detailed and greatly improved measures of size and gender preference were developed, the Coombs scales, which allowed the two phenomena to be disentangled (Coombs, Coombs and McClelland 1975). Though the publication of these new techniques coincided with the start of the World Fertility Survey, the topic of preferences was not considered of sufficient importance for the Coombs scales to become an integral part of the WFS recommended data collection instrument, the core questionnaire, though they were added to two national questionnaires (Malaysia and Republic of Korea). Indeed the core questionnaire contains only a single explicitly relevant item, namely a simple question concerning the preferred sex of the next child. Obviously, answers to this question cannot be used as an individual-level measure of gender preference as they are confined to women who considered themselves both physically capable and desirous of having more children and are heavily influenced by the sex of children already born. Furthermore the respondents in WFS surveys are exclusively women; different results might have been obtained had husbands also been interviewed. There is evidence that husbands are more likely to express a son preference than are wives, though there are exceptions (Williamson 1976; Coombs and Fernandez 1978). However, as will be shown below, the WFS data are of considerable descriptive value, particularly for comparing a large number of populations.

While cross-cultural variations in explicitly stated gender preferences are of mild interest, their importance lies in their possible impact on fertility decisions and behaviour. With WFS data, as indeed with most data sets, these effects can only be studied inferentially, by comparing the behaviour of couples with different family compositions. Where behaviour diverges between couples with the same total number of children but with varying numbers of boys and girls in the family, underlying preferences may be inferred. The inference takes the form of imputing a greater satisfaction with their existing family composition to parents who say that they desire no more children or act to stop having more children than to other parents. Many such analyses have been performed both at the national level and cross-nationally. In this report, we examine: (a) the propensity to cease childbearing, as indicated by the stated desire to have no more children; (b) family limitation behaviour as indicated by current use of contraception; and finally (c) the rate of fertility itself, in relation to the sex composition of surviving children.

Two deficiencies in this analytic approach have been pointed out by McClelland (1979). First, the observed aggregate association between family composition and subsequent behaviour may not capture the full extent of individual family effects if individual preferences vary and their effects are mutually cancelling at the aggregate level.

7

For instance if half of all married couples want more boys than girls and the other half want more girls than boys and if both types of couples are prepared to act upon these preferences, then the effect of preferences on the level of fertility will be considerable but no relationship between family composition and subsequent childbearing will be discernible. Thus an aggregate analysis may seriously underestimate the impact of preferences. Secondly, McClelland questions the underlying assumption of the inferential approach, namely that families with an undesired composition will necessarily be more likely to continue childbearing than those who have achieved a more desired composition. Fear of obtaining an even less desirable balance of boys and girls with the birth of the next child or overall size considerations may inhibit the former group from continuing childbearing. Particularly if parents with, say, three children of the same sex consider themselves destined to produce only offspring of this sex, this fear could be a powerful deterrent.

Theoretical objections have also been advanced by Ben-Porath and Welch (1976). If a preference for one sex over another is based on considerations of differential net price or cost rather than on tastes, couples burdened with children of the more 'expensive', disfavoured sex are less able to afford extra children than those with offspring of the 'cheaper' gender. Thus the correct interpretation of an observed effect of composition on future fertility may be the opposite of that usually assumed.

Though these objections and complexities have some validity, in practice it is unlikely that they are sufficiently important to invalidate the traditional analysis of the impact of gender composition on fertility behaviour that is presented in this report. The economist's conceptual distinction between prices and tastes and their application to reproductive decisions seems to us unlikely to be paralleled in the minds of couples of societies included in the present study. While the long-term economic benefit derived from sons may differ from that derived from daughters, the short-term costs of nurture are not likely to diverge so greatly. And if they do diverge it will be because of expenditure on education, with the favoured sex receiving more schooling. Thus it is possible that the net price of children might blur or weaken the impact of tastes but implausible to expect any stronger effect. The possible heterogeneity of preferences is a potentially important objection, but there is convincing evidence from the data presented in this report (particularly table A1) that a reasonably high degree of uniformity in desired gender compositions exists within societies. Furthermore it is likely that these preferences are more a reflection of pervasive societal norms rather than of personal idiosyncrasies.

Naturally many factors other than gender preferences influence family size decisions; not least are considerations of overall size and the risk of acquiring an even less desirable composition with the birth of another child. In this analysis, we can only hope to measure the effects of composition on fertility, net of the influence of all these other factors. In conclusion, we accept that WFS data will permit no profound understanding of the origins of gender preferences nor of the complex ways in which they may interact with other aspirations in their influence (if any) on fertility behaviour. However we believe that an essentially descriptive presentation of these data will be both valid and valuable.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The basic data presented in this report are contained in four tables dealing respectively with: (a) the preferred sex of the next child, explicitly stated by women wanting at least one more child; (b) the proportions stating a wish to stop childbearing; (c) the proportions practising contraception at the time of survey; (d) the fertility rate in the five years preceding the survey. The data in the first three tables are cross-classified by current family size and gender composition, and, in the last table, by family size and composition at the start of the five-year period.

The structure of all four tables is identical, consisting of the following array of 12 possible combinations of size and composition:

| Family | Family size | | | | | |
|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--|--|--|
| composition | 2 children | 3 children | 4 children | | | |
| All boys | a ₁ | C ₁ | e ₁ | | | |
| All but one boy | | d ₁ | f_1 | | | |
| Balance | Ъ | | g | | | |
| All but one girl | | d ₂ | f2 | | | |
| All girls | a ₂ | c2 | e ₂ | | | |

Several features of this table structure deserve comment. First, attention is restricted to a limited range of family sizes. Women with less than two children are excluded because an overwhelming majority of them will not be interested in family limitation; in most WFS surveys, negligible proportions want less than two children. Also excluded are women with more than four surviving offspring. Apart from wishing to avoid the presentation of an excessive volume of data, the decision to exclude larger families reflects the belief that compositional effects are unlikely to be found, because the vast majority of larger families will contain at least one child, and typically two or more of each sex. Furthermore, it would require sample sizes considerably greater than those of the WFS programme to examine all possible combinations of boys and girls among families with five or more children. An additional positive justification for narrowing the focus of interest to two-, three-, and four-child families is that this range is of crucial importance for family limitation decisions; a majority of younger women in most WFS surveys express a desire for two, three or four children.

The absence of demographic controls, such as current age or marital duration of mothers, should also be noted. Because the live birth sex ratio is more or less a biological constant, on average the characteristics of women with different balances of boys and girls, within specified overall family sizes, are the same. This assertion may not be strictly true if there are pronounced gender-specific differentials in infant and child mortality and is violated where gender composition is a major determinant of the tempo of fertility. This latter possibility does not matter in the case of attitudes towards family limitation and contraception; the confounding effects of current age or marital duration, once family size is controlled, are likely to be minor. However, in the analysis of fertility, any age or duration differences between women of varying family compositions could have potentially serious consequences for the interpretation of results, because these two factors are major determinants of fertility. However, a check revealed that such differences were minor and can be disregarded in the context of this analysis.

In addition to straightforward description of the proportions and rates in tables A1-A4, two simple models are fitted to the data. The first, termed the 'no composition effects' model, assumes that the response does not vary according to sex composition, after taking into account overall family size. For each column in the prototype table above, the individual cell responses are compared with the overall pooled response for that column to give measures of discrepancy or deviance. These deviances are summed across all three columns to give an overall measure of goodness of fit. To the extent that this model fits the data, a conclusion of no significant effects of composition is reached. Where the 'no composition effects' model provides a poor fit (p < 0.1) to the data of a particular country, the magnitude and variability of effects has to be ascertained by inspection of the whole table.

In addition, one further model is applied, in an attempt to elucidate the nature of the effect. This model makes use of the inherent symmetry of the cross-classified data (see illustration above). The two cells, b and g, in which composition is perfectly balanced are ignored, but the model assumes that, in the remaining cells, the response is unaffected by the direction of imbalance (ie whether towards more boys or more girls). Specifically, the model assumes that the response in cells a_1 and a_2 are the same and similarly for the paired cells c, d, e and f. If this 'symmetrical effects' model fits the data, the conclusion may be drawn that the attitude or aspect of behaviour in question is not significantly influenced by a differential preference between sons and daughters. In other words, the effect is symmetrical.

The 'no composition effects' and 'symmetrical effects' models were fitted to the tables using the statistical package GLIM (Baker and Nelder 1978) whose principal use is the fitting of generalized linear models to data. A discussion of the applicability of such models to tables of proportions and rates can be found in Little (1978) and Hobcraft et al (1982). In this analysis, a logit-linear model was used for the proportions wanting no more children and the proportions contracepting, and a log-linear model for the fertility rates. The key output after each fit is an overall measure of goodness of fit of the model to the data called the deviance (log-likelihood ratio statistic) and its residual degrees of freedom. If the fitted model adequately represents the data to within sampling variation, the deviance has in large samples a chi-square distribution, with residual degrees of freedom given by the difference between the number of non-empty cells in the table and the number of parameters in the model. The goodness of fit of the 'no composition' effects and 'symmetrical effects' models were assessed using the deviance and its residual degrees of freedom.

2.1 STATED PREFERENCE FOR THE SEX OF THE NEXT CHILD

As mentioned above, the WFS core questionnaire contains the following question concerning the preferred sex of the next child: 'Would you prefer your next (first) child to be a boy or a girl?' This was asked of all pregnant women (in slightly modified form) and of all currently married women who wanted at least one more child and considered themselves physically capable of having another child (ie selfreported fecund). Provision in the questionnaire was made for three pre-coded answers (boy, girl, either) plus an open-ended fourth category for other answers to be specified. In certain national surveys, this fourth category was not included and, in most surveys, other answers were pooled together in a single code. In this analysis, 'undecided', 'either', 'other' and 'not stated' responses have been combined to form a single group, whose only common feature is that the respondent did not state a clear preference for a boy or a girl.

Answers for the whole sample of currently married, fecund women who want another child,¹ are shown in the right-hand column of table 1 and in figure 1. One of the more prominent features of these data is the appreciable proportions of women who did not state a preference. For the majority of countries, this proportion lies between 20 and 40 per cent; it rises to over 40 per cent in three cases (Kenya, Jordan and Haiti). No obvious regional pattern is evident.

In high fertility countries, a relative lack of concern with the gender of the next child would not be surprising, because most families can expect at least one and probably more children of both sexes.

However, there is no discernible association between the level of national fertility and the proportion in the undecided/other category. For instance, Costa Rica, with one of the lowest fertility levels of the 27 countries, has a high percentage (36 per cent) of respondents who stated no clear preference. Undoubtedly, cultural variations exist in the willingness to state a choice on a subject essentially unamenable to human intervention. In this analysis, such variations cannot be distinguished from genuine differences in levels of concern for the sex of future children.

The relationship between family size and the proportion who are not prepared to state a preference for the sex of their next child takes several forms. The commonest pattern (eg Thailand, Colombia, Philippines) is a U-shaped distribution. Among women with no children, a high proportion are undecided; the proportion initially drops and then rises, as family size increases. In Sri Lanka and Paraguay, the initial decline is apparent, but there is no increase at higher sizes, while in Kenya, Lesotho, Jordan and Syria there is no link with family size. Only in Korea, and to a lesser extent in Pakistan, does the proportion without a clear preference continue to decline more or less monotonically as size increases. Interpretation of these figures is obscured by the confounding effect of size preferences and by the selectivity, among high parity women, of those who wish to continue childbearing. Nevertheless, one tentative conclusion can be drawn: the desire for a child of a particular sex does not appear to be a major motive (except in Korea and possibly Pakistan) in the desire to continue childbearing among women who already have four or more living children.

We turn now to discuss the percentage of women who state a clear preference for the gender of their next child. In two Arab countries (Jordan and Syria), three countries of the Indian sub-continent (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan) and finally in Korea, respondents expressed an overwhelming preference for boys over girls, with typically only one woman wanting a daughter for every five or more who want a son. This extreme group is followed by a fair number of countries (Lesotho, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Fiji, Malaysia, Dominican Republic and Mexico) where a son preference is clearly apparent but is less pronounced than in the first group. There are only two countries (Jamaica, Venezuela) where a daughter is more likely to be preferred than a son. In Jamaica the difference is large; 52 per cent would prefer a daughter compared to 31 per cent a son. In Venezuela the corresponding figures are 43 and 33 per cent.

The final and largest group comprises countries in which there is little or no evidence of overall gender preference. This group includes all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (except Dominican Republic, Mexico, Jamaica and Venezuela), as well as Indonesia, Philippines and Kenya.

These findings are summarized below by apportioning the undecided category equally between the other two categories and then taking the ratio of the enlarged 'prefer boy' group to the similarly enlarged 'prefer girl' group.

| Strong son preference | | Moderate son preference | | Equal preference | | Daughter preference | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|------------------------|------------|
| Pakistan Nepal Bangladesh Korea Syria Jordan | 4.9 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.3 1.9 | Lesotho Sri Lanka Sudan Thailand Fiji Malaysia Dominican Republic Mexico | 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 | Kenya Indonesia Peru Guyana Trinidad an Tobago Colombia Paraguay Costa Rica Panama Philippines | 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 | Venezuela Jamaica | 0.8 0.7 |
| | | | | Haiti | 0.9 | | |

¹ Though all pregnant women were asked the question on gender preference, their answers are only preserved on WFS standard recode files if they wanted another child, after the one they were currently expecting.

| Table 1 | Preferen | ces for | the sex | of the | next | child a | among |
|-----------|--------------|----------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| currently | married, | fecund | women | who w | vant a | nother | child, |
| by numbe | er of living | g childr | en | | | | |

Table 1(cont)

| | | No | of livi | ng ch | ildren | | | |
|---------------|----------------|----|---------|-------|--------|----|-----|-----|
| | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 + | All |
| Africa | | | | | | | | |
| Kenya | B ^a | 28 | 30 | 25 | 26 | 21 | 23 | 25 |
| | G | 23 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 23 | 19 | 21 |
| | U | 49 | 49 | 53 | 53 | 56 | 58 | 54 |
| Lesotho | B | 59 | 51 | 49 | 51 | 45 | 45 | 51 |
| | G | 22 | 35 | 30 | 34 | 35 | 37 | 31 |
| | U | 19 | 14 | 21 | 15 | 20 | 17 | 18 |
| Sudan (North) | B | 39 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 42 | 41 | 42 |
| | G | 19 | 26 | 24 | 27 | 19 | 22 | 23 |
| | U | 42 | 31 | 33 | 29 | 39 | 37 | 35 |
| Jordan | B | 35 | 35 | 37 | 43 | 46 | 46 | 41 |
| | G | 11 | 13 | 18 | 13 | 10 | 7 | 11 |
| | U | 54 | 52 | 45 | 44 | 44 | 47 | 48 |
| Syria | B | 50 | 45 | 47 | 56 | 49 | 52 | 50 |
| | G | 6 | 12 | 15 | 14 | 9 | 8 | -11 |
| | U | 44 | 43 | 38 | 30 | 42 | 40 | 39 |
| Asia | | | | | | | | |
| Bangladesh | B | 60 | 60 | 61 | 58 | 59 | 58 | 60 |
| | G | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| | U | 38 | 28 | 27 | 29 | 35 | 35 | 33 |
| Nepal | B | 71 | 63 | 64 | 66 | 71 | 71 | 67 |
| | G | 1 | 8 | 13 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 7 |
| | U | 28 | 29 | 23 | 19 | 19 | 24 | 26 |
| Pakistan | B | 73 | 65 | 71 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 71 |
| | G | 2 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 5 |
| | U | 25 | 29 | 29 | 21 | 22 | 18 | 24 |
| Sri Lanka | B | 55 | 47 | 49 | 57 | 51 | 58 | 51 |
| | G | 16 | 43 | 35 | 25 | 28 | 27 | 31 |
| | U | 29 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 15 | 18 |
| Fiji | B | 43 | 45 | 41 | 43 | 46 | 43 | 43 |
| | G | 12 | 39 | 32 | 40 | 36 | 31 | 31 |
| | U | 45 | 16 | 27 | 17 | 18 | 26 | 26 |
| Indonesia | B | 34 | 35 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 35 | 34 |
| | G | 19 | 33 | 31 | 37 | 33 | 25 | 29 |
| | U | 47 | 32 | 35 | 29 | 36 | 40 | 37 |
| Korea | B | 63 | 60 | 68 | 83 | 94 | 97 | 67 |
| | G | 3 | 19 | 22 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 14 |
| | U | 34 | 21 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 19 |
| Malaysia | B | 24 | 37 | 37 | 39 | 42 | 37 | 36 |
| | G | 13 | 33 | 30 | 34 | 30 | 26 | 29 |
| | U | 63 | 30 | 33 | 27 | 28 | 37 | 35 |
| Philippines | B ^a | 26 | 38 | 35 | 39 | 33 | 24 | 34 |
| | G | 19 | 43 | 39 | 41 | 39 | 39 | 38 |
| | U | 55 | 19 | 26 | 20 | 28 | 37 | 28 |
| Thailand | B | 55 | 45 | 51 | 51 | 45 | 47 | 49 |
| | G | 16 | 45 | 33 | 36 | 38 | 29 | 34 |

| | | No | No of living children | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 + | All |
| Americas | | | | | | | | |
| Colombia | B | 49 | 40 | 41 | 50 | 34 | 32 | 42 |
| | G | 30 | 43 | 46 | 42 | 44 | 38 | 41 |
| | U | 21 | 17 | 13 | 8 | 22 | 30 | 17 |
| Paraguay | B | 32 | 41 | 32 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 36 |
| | G | 30 | 41 | 40 | 39 | 37 | 33 | 37 |
| | U | 38 | 18 | 28 | 26 | 38 | 32 | 27 |
| Peru | B | 34 | 38 | 41 | 40 | 32 | 38 | 38 |
| | G | 28 | 43 | 35 | 41 | 31 | 22 | 35 |
| | U | 38 | 19 | 24 | 19 | 37 | 40 | 27 |
| Venezuela | B | 32 | 36 | 35 | 30 | 25 | 28 | 33 |
| | G | 33 | 46 | 44 | 50 | 55 | 32 | 43 |
| | U | 35 | 18 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 40 | 24 |
| Costa Rica | B | 19 | 38 | 28 | 38 | 32 | 31 | 32 |
| | G | 25 | 37 | 33 | 36 | 29 | 25 | 32 |
| | U | 56 | 25 | 39 | 26 | 39 | 44 | 36 |
| Dominican Republic | B G U | 48 32 20 | 43 52 5 | 54 35 11 | 50 41 9 | 50 33 17 | 38 37 25 | 47 39 14 |
| Mexico | B | 33 | 40 | 36 | 41 | 42 | 33 | 37 |
| | G | 17 | 35 | 31 | 35 | 24 | 22 | 28 |
| | U | 50 | 25 | 33 | 24 | 34 | 45 | 35 |
| Panama | B | 35 | 41 | 32 | 49 | 48 | 41 | 39 |
| | G | 29 | 44 | 51 | 37 | 35 | 32 | 41 |
| | U | 36 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 17 | 27 | 20 |
| Guyana | B | 39 | 43 | 37 | 41 | 36 | 28 | 39 |
| | G | 27 | 41 | 35 | 44 | 44 | 35 | 36 |
| | U | 34 | 16 | 28 | 15 | 20 | 37 | 25 |
| Haiti | B | 22 | 29 | 36 | 15 | 8 | 17 | 25 |
| | G | 26 | 33 | 28 | 32 | 20 | 26 | 29 |
| | U | 52 | 38 | 36 | 53 | 72 | 57 | 46 |
| Jamaica | B | 26 | 37 | 24 | 42 | 29 | 31 | 31 |
| | G | 50 | 51 | 60 | 47 | 57 | 44 | 52 |
| | U | 24 | 12 | 16 | 11 | 14 | 25 | 17 |
| Trinidad | B | 44 | 41 | 38 | 51 | 46 | 42 | 42 |
| | G | 28 | 43 | 35 | 39 | 45 | 41 | 36 |
| | U | 28 | 16 | 27 | 10 | 9 | 17 | 22 |

 ${}^{a}B = prefer$ boy, G = prefer girl, U = undecided, either, other or not stated.

It has been suggested that a preference for the first child to be a boy is prevalent, even in cultures where a desired sex ratio for subsequent children is balanced (eg Markle 1974). A comparison of the answers given by women with no living children with those women with at least one child offers little support for this view (table 1). As pointed out earlier, the percentage stating no particular preference is especially large for women without any children and, partly as a consequence, the percentage preferring a boy rises above 50 in only 7 of the 27 countries. Nevertheless, in a number of cases, there is evidence of a stronger son preference for the first child than for subsequent children.





| | | | Syria | Mexico | Philippines | Venezuela |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|--|----------------|
| Two living children | | | | | рии и и на | |
| Number of boys | 2 | B ^a G U | 21 46 33 | 8 80 12 | 1 89 10 | 4 90 6 |
| | 1 | B G U | 47 2 51 | 33 18 49 | 25 30 45 | 22 42 36 |
| | 0 | B G U | 80 0 20 | 73 4 23 | 84 1 15 | 81 8 11 |
| Three living children | | | | , | | |
| Number of boys | 3 | B G U | 20 54 26 | 5 86 9 | 0 95 5 | 0 90 10 |
| | 2 | B G U | 42 14 44 | 13 58 29 | 5 65 30 | 3 75 22 |
| | 1 | B G U | 74 2 24 | 66 7 27 | 71 4 25 | 60 14 26 |
| | 0 | B G U | 89 0 20 | 70 8 22 | 93 0 7 | 82 0 18 |
| Four living children | | | | | | |
| Number of boys | 4 | B G U | 17 50 33 | 8 69 23 | 0 96 4 | 0 83 17 |
| | 3 | B G U | 31 18 51 | 7 53 40 | 3 66 31 | 0 92 8 |
| | 2 | B G U | 38 1 61 | 37 15 48 | 32 30 38 | 22 45 33 |
| | 1 | B G U | 79 0 21 | 71 4 25 | 62 4 34 | 56 22 22 |
| | 0 | B G U | 82 0 18 | 92 8 0 | 100 0 0 | 100 0 0 |

 Table 2
 Preferences for the sex of the next child in selected countries among currently married, fecund women who want another child, by existing family size and composition

 $^{a}B = prefer boy, G = prefer girl, U = undecided, either, other or not stated.$

For instance in Thailand, among those with no living children, 55 per cent stated a preference for a boy, compared to 16 per cent in favour of a girl. The corresponding figures for all family sizes are 49 and 34 per cent. A similar pattern is also found in Sri Lanka, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Colombia and Mexico. In Venezuela, the overall daughter preference disappears for the first child, though, interestingly, in Jamaica the daughter preference is maintained. Apart from the special case of women with no children, the relative preference for boys and girls does not change systematically as family size increases. The only striking exception to this generalization is Korea, where the proportion preferring a boy increases and the proportion preferring a girl decreases across family sizes one to five or more. Similar but less pronounced tendencies are also found in Jordan, Nepal and Pakistan.

A more detailed scrutiny of explicit preferences is

13

provided in table A1, which shows the relationship between number of sons and daughters in the family and preferred sex of the next child. The 27 countries fall into four main groups, which correspond closely to the groups described earlier. In the first group of countries (Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Korea, Syria, Jordan), there is a preference for a daughter only when there are boys but no living girls in the family; with all other family compositions, a clear bias in favour of boys is apparent. In table 2, Syria represents an illustrative example of this group. As may be seen in this table, an appreciable proportion of women without a daughter nevertheless state a preference for the next child to be a son. This tendency is even more pronounced in Pakistan but is less apparent in the other four countries.

Respondents in the second group of countries, most of which were previously classified as having a moderate preference for boys, exhibit a preference for balance, but, where there is already a balance, a preference for sons over daughters. Lesotho, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Fiji, Malaysia, Mexico and Peru fall into this group and the pattern is exemplified in table 2 by Mexico.

The largest group, comprising Dominican Republic, Kenya, Indonesia, Guyana, Trinidad, Colombia, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Panama, Philippines and Haiti is dominated by a desire for a balanced composition. Among women with imbalanced families, the majority want a child that will contribute towards balance; and where there is already balance, no marked preference for either sex is shown. The Philippines illustrates well this situation.

The final group contains the two countries, Jamaica and Venezuela, where a preference for girls was observed earlier. In both cases, balance is also a consideration and the majority in favour of girls is confined to women who have fewer girls than boys in the family or who have equal numbers of girls and boys.

2.2 SEX RATIO OF LAST WANTED BIRTH

If a preference for boys over girls, whatever precise form it takes, actually influences decisions concerning family limitation, the last child should be disproportionately male. The reverse should be true for girl-preferring societies. This will be so because, at each parity increment, parents will tend to be more satisfied with the advent of a baby of the favoured sex than of the disfavoured sex and are thus more likely to cease further childbearing.

With WFS data, the identification of the last child can only be made with certainty for sterilized women or with reasonable probability for women in the oldest age group or those with a long open interval, for instance, an open interval of five years or more. However, the last *wanted* child can be identified in those surveys (20 out of 28) which used the fertility regulation module by making use of data on desire for more children in conjunction with data on the wantedness of the last child.

Women wanting more children or undecided have not yet reached a last wanted birth; for those who want no more children but wanted their last child, the most recently born child is defined as the last wanted birth. Finally, for those women who want no more children and did not want their last child, the penultimate birth is assumed to be the last wanted birth. For the remaining surveys which did not use the fertility regulation module, no data are available on the wantedness of the last child. However, by making the assumption that women who want no more children nevertheless did want their last child, an approximate identification of the last wanted child is possible.

The sex ratios of last wanted births and, for comparison, of all preceding births, are shown in table 3. Ignoring deviations of ± 10 per cent from the expected biological value of 103-105, we find very few outliers, except for the six countries previously classified as exhibiting a strong preference for sons. Of these, Korea is the most extreme, with a sex ratio for the last wanted birth of 152.

Table 3Sex ratios of last wanted births compared to sexratios of all preceding births, confined to currently married,fecund, non-pregnant women

| Country | Sex ratios | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Last wanted births | All preceding births |
| Kenya | 100.9 | 98.6 |
| Lesotho | 94.7 | 102.1 |
| Sudan (North) | 104.8 | 103.8 |
| Jordan | 134.3 | 103.5 |
| Syria | 122.0 | 104.3 |
| Bangladesh | 119.8 | 100.2 |
| Nepal | 130.7 | 99.9 |
| Pakistan | 131.6 | 107.8 |
| Sri Lanka | 99.7 | 103.4 |
| Fiji | 116.7 | 104.8 |
| Indonesia | 98.2 | 98.6 |
| Korea | 151.6 | 88.6 |
| Malaysia | 111.2 | 102.9 |
| Philippines | 96.1 | 106.5 |
| Thailand | 107.6 | 106.5 |
| Colombia | 104.9 | 104.3 |
| Paraguay | 104.9 | 103.4 |
| Peru | 96.4 | 103.0 |
| Venezuela | 104.4 | 98.1 |
| Costa Rica | 94.4 | 104.3 |
| Dominican Republic | 108.7 | 104.4 |
| Mexico | 101.9 | 103.3 |
| Panama | 104.2 | 104.6 |
| Guyana | 108.0 | 100.1 |
| Haiti | 104.8 | 102.8 |
| Jamaica Trinidad | 97.1 | 107.5 |
| and Tobago | 96.6 | 98.4 |
| Senegal ^a | NA | NA |

^aThe question on desire to have more children was not asked in the Senegal survey.

2.3 SELF-DECLARED PROPENSITY TO CEASE CHILDBEARING

The WFS core questionnaire contains three main measures of attitude toward family size and family limitation. All currently married, fecund women were asked if they wanted another child at some time in the future. Women answering affirmatively were then asked how many additional children they wanted. Finally, all women, regardless of their fecundity or marital status, were asked a more hypothetical question on total desired family size.

For this analysis of the effect of sex composition of living children on fertility preferences, the first of these three items (whether another child is wanted) has been singled out for examination because of its relatively straightforward nature. A fair degree of overlap and consistency exists between the three variables and, almost certainly, similar results would have been obtained regardless of the measure chosen.

The detailed findings, in terms of the percentage of women wanting no more children, are shown in table A2, for family sizes of two, three and four. These results are summarized in figure 2 for women with two and with four living children. This figure is composed of a series of bar charts which indicate the absolute differences in the percentage wanting no more children between women with a perfectly balanced composition and those with specified imbalances. The upper series of charts relating to two-child families has two bars for each country; the left-hand bar indicates the difference in the percentage wanting no more children between women with two sons and women with a balanced composition of one son and one daughter; the right-hand bar represents the equivalent difference between women with two daughters and women with one child of each sex. The absolute magnitudes of the differences are, of course, gauged by the heights of the bars and the directions of differences by whether the bars protrude above the vertical line which indicates a positive difference (ie a higher percentage of women with the unbalanced composition want no more children than of women with the balanced composition) or below which indicates a negative difference. The lower series of bar charts in figure 2 are constructed in an analagous manner for four-child families. The four bars for each country represent the four possible unbalanced combinations (viz. 4 boys/0 girls, 3 boys/1 girl, 1 boy/3 girls, 0 boys/4 girls).

Two features of figure 2 are dominant. The first is the more pronounced differences in Asia than in the other regions, suggesting that Asian mothers are particularly sensitive to the composition of their families. The second feature is the relative infrequency of positive deviations from the balanced position; in other words, the proportions of women stating a desire to stop childbearing are rarely higher among those with unequal numbers of boys and girls than among those who have already achieved equality. Balance, then, is generally conducive to a self-declared interest in family limitation, though, as we shall see, there are a number of exceptions.

A more detailed examination of figure 2 and table A2 reveals a considerable variety of patterns among countries. In the two countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya and Lesotho, the impact of composition on the desire to cease childbearing is minor. Among the Arab states, the data for

Sudan (North) also show little variation, except for the minority of respondents with four daughters and no sons who are much less favourable to family limitation than women with other compositions. As might be expected from the earlier results, the other two Arab countries, Jordan and Syria, exhibit clear evidence of a son preference. Among two-child families in both countries, about 20 per cent of respondents with one or two boys say that they want no more children, compared to under 10 per cent of women with two girls. Among three-child families, the difference between the son-dominated and daughterdominated families is of the same magnitude (ie a ratio of two to one); for women with four children the inferred strong son preference persists in Jordan but, unexpectedly, erodes in Syria where the highest proportion wanting to stop childbearing is found for those with a balanced composition.

In the Asian region, Bangladesh,² Nepal, Pakistan and Korea once again form a reasonably homogeneous group. At family size two, the two-son combination appears to be at least as acceptable, if not more so, than one child of each sex, while the two-daughter family is clearly perceived to be less satisfactory. This is particularly striking in Korea where only 38 per cent of women with two girls want no more children, compared to 72 and 77 per cent of those with one and two boys, respectively. At family size four, the three boy and one girl combination is slightly preferred to a balanced family of two boys and two girls, as evidenced by the proportions wanting no further children, while women with all sons hold similar attitudes to those with balanced families. Women with less than two boys in the family are much less likely to state an interest in limiting their family size to four children.

A second fairly homogeneous group of countries can be identified within the Asian region, namely Sri Lanka, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. As illustrated in figure 2, women with a balanced composition, without exception, are on average more likely to want to stop childbearing than women with a sex imbalance among their surviving children. Furthermore the differences are typically substantial, in the range of 10-30 per cent. In Philippines and Indonesia, the results display an almost perfect symmetry in the direction and magnitude of deviations from balance. Thus women with a family of two girls are as likely to want to stop childbearing as those with two boys; those with two girls and one boy are similar in their attitude to those with two boys and one girl and so on.

In Sri Lanka, Fiji and Malaysia, such striking symmetry is not apparent; rather, there is a tendency for women with a surplus of sons to be more favourably disposed to family limitation than women with a surplus of daughters. In Malaysia, for instance, 28 per cent of women with three sons and no daughters wished to limit their families, compared to 15 per cent of women with three daughters only; the corresponding figures are 44 and 31 per cent for those with a two-boy/one-girl and a two-girl/one-boy combination, respectively. Thus for Sri Lanka, Fiji and Malaysia, perfectly balanced numbers of sons and daughters appear to be most conducive to family limitation, but, where balance

 $^{^{2}}$ The Bangladesh data are not strictly comparable with other data, because the relevant question asked whether another child was wanted *soon*.

Africa

Asia

Two-child family



Figure 2 Percentage of women wanting no more children

16

Americas

Two-child family





Four-child family

does not exist, an excess of sons over daughters is perceived to be more satisfactory than an excess of daughters over sons.

In Thailand, the final country of the Asian region, the effect of composition on the self-reported propensity to limit family size appears to be less pronounced than in the other countries of this region. Among two and three-child families, there is a preference for balanced compositions and evidence of a greater satisfaction from sons than from daughters. However, among four-child families, differences are negligible; nearly 90 per cent of women state a desire to stop childbearing, regardless of the numbers of sons and daughters.

As mentioned earlier, the associations between family composition and attitude to further childbearing are weak in Latin America and the Caribbean, by comparison with most of the Asian countries. Indeed, as will be shown below, the differences in the proportions wanting no more children are typically not significant (p > 0.1), the exceptions being Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. In Venezuela and Panama there are appreciable but symmetrical differences between unbalanced and balanced compositions for two-child families. Over 50 per cent of women with a boy and a girl wish to limit their family size, compared to between 34 and 39 per cent of women with two children of the same sex. Much less differentiation is observed among larger families, a pattern which suggests that considerations of total family size increasingly over-ride compositional influences. In Mexico, the reverse appears to be the case; composition effects are more pronounced at family sizes three and four than at two.

The results for Guyana defy straightforward interpretation, reflecting perhaps the multi-racial nature of this country. A greater degree of satisfaction with a more balanced composition can be inferred for respondents with

Table 4The effect of composition on the stated desire to have no more children: observed levels of significance (p-values)for two models

| | No of | Percentage wanting | Goodness of fit: p-valu | Jes |
|-------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | respondents | no more children | 'No composition effects' model | 'Symmetrical effects' model |
| Africa | | | | |
| Kenya | 1633 | 21 | .2609 | All Calls |
| Lesotho | 1033 | 14 | .9611 | |
| Senegal ^a | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Sudan (North) | 846 | 16 | .2812 | _ |
| Jordan | 774 | 30 | .0007 | .0001 |
| Syria | 1078 | 34 | .0024 | .0031 |
| Asia | | | | |
| Bangladesh ^b | 1911 | 80 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Nepal | 1934 | 50 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Pakistan | 1279 | 46 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Sri Lanka | 2095 | 73 | .0000 | .0019 |
| Fiji | 1570 | 54 | .0000 | .2388 |
| Indonesia | 2684 | 55 | .0000 | .4666 |
| Korea | 2306 | 84 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Malaysia | 2026 | 36 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Philippines | 3206 | 61 | .0000 | .2685 |
| Thailand | 1243 | 69 | .004I | .0625 |
| Americas | | | | |
| Colombia | 1030 | 64 | .4431 | |
| Paraguay | 874 | 34 | .6505 | www. |
| Peru | 1855 | 64 | .4548 | منتبذ |
| Venezuela | 891 | 62 | .0270 | .3236 |
| Costa Rica | 1051 | 53 | .6977 | |
| Dominican Republic | 578 | 59 | .2139 | |
| Mexico | 1810 | 52 | .0048 | .0608 |
| Panama | 1091 | 65 | .0286 | .2200 |
| Guyana | 1047 | 63 | .0058 | .3312 |
| Haiti | 575 | 65 | .8942 | _ |
| Jamaica | 755 | 58 | .2028 | m., |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1096 | 61 | .0076 | .1522 |

^aThe question on desire to have more children was not asked in the Senegal survey.

^bThe relevant question in the Bangladesh survey asked whether any more children were desired soon.

two or three living children but, at family size four, the association between composition and desire to cease childbearing is not pronounced. Thus, as in Venezuela and Panama, it appears that overall family size becomes the decisive factor. In Trinidad and Tobago, the data suggest that the desire for balance and a son preference co-exist. Finally, we may note that the results for Jamaica, though not statistically significant (p = 0.2), are consistent with a preference for daughters. Among women with two children, 57 per cent of those with daughters only state a desire to have no more children compared to 46 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively, for those with one and no daughters. Differences of a similar magnitude and direction are maintained at family sizes three and four. These results contrast with those for Venezuela, where the previous evidence of a daughter preference is not confirmed by table A2.

The statistical significance of the results in table A2 is summarized in table 4. As outlined earlier in section 1.2, two models are used. The 'no composition effects' model assumes that, within each family size, the percentages wanting no more children are constant across the various family compositions. The degree to which this model fits the data is indicated in table 4, by p-values derived from chi-squared distributions with nine degrees of freedom. This model provides a reasonable fit (p > 0.1) for 10 of the 27 countries for which data are available. These include Kenya, Lesotho and Sudan (North), plus 7 of the 12 Latin American and Caribbean countries. The model can be rejected with reasonable statistical confidence in Venezuela and Panama and with a high degree of confidence (p < 0.01)in the remaining countries, which comprise all the Asian group plus Jordan, Syria, Mexico, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.

For countries where the effects of composition were statistically significant at the 0.1 level, the 'symmetrical effects' model is fitted. This model assumes that the percentage of women wanting no more children is symmetrical across compositions, in the sense that, while the degree of imbalance might affect the response, its direction will have no effect (see section 1.2 for a more detailed exposition). The right-hand column of table 4 indicates a good fit for this model in the case of Fiji, Indonesia, Philippines, Venezuela, Panama and Guyana and a moderate fit for Trinidad and Tobago. We may conclude that for these countries there is significant evidence of compositional effects on self-declared desire to limit family size but that the latter do not take the form of a differential preference between sons and daughters.

The symmetrical effects model provides a poor fit for the other countries to which it was applied. In the majority of cases, the reason is obvious from an inspection of table A2 and figure 2 and stems from the existence of a strong or moderate inferred preference for sons.

2.4 CURRENT USE OF CONTRACEPTION

In the last section, the association between family composition and the stated desire of women to have no more children was examined. In this section, the analysis is taken a step further by examining the association between composition and current use of contraception. While data in the previous section were based on the non-pregnant subsample of currently married, fecund women, the figures on contraceptive practice in this section are based on all currently married, fecund women. Pregnant women, though not currently exposed to risk of conception, are included in the denominator because their exclusion could distort the cross-national comparison.

Current use refers to reported use at time of survey of any method of contraception, including sterilization. It thus encompasses both the motivation to limit family size and to space births. Lightbourne, Singh and Green (1982) have pointed out that a high proportion of current users in WFS surveys appear to be spacers rather than limiters; but this fact need not be regarded as a disadvantage because it is reasonable to regard both the tempo as well as the quantum of fertility as being of approximately equal interest. As indicated in table 5 below, levels of use among women with two to four living children vary widely, from under 10 per cent in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Nepal and Pakistan to over 60 per cent in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago.

The detailed cross-classifications of current use by family size and composition may be found in table A3 and are summarized in figure 3, which is constructed in an identical manner to figure 2. These two figures provide a striking contrast. A much more pronounced impact of composition on the desire to have no more children was observed for most of the Asian countries than for other regions. However, for contraception, the position is reversed, with larger absolute effects in Latin America and the Caribbean than in Asia. Part of the reason for this apparent discrepancy lies in the very low levels of use in such countries as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal; but even in countries where contraception is relatively widespread, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines the associations between composition and use are much more modest than those observed for the stated desire to limit family size. In contrast, the effects on use in Latin America and the Caribbean tend to be as large as those for the attitudinal data

Among women with only two living children, a balanced composition of one son and one daughter is generally more conducive to contraceptive practice than unbalanced compositions, both in Asia and the Americas. The few exceptions are clearly identified in figure 3. They include Jordan, Korea and Dominican Republic where women with two sons are most likely to be contracepting. In Africa and Asia, the inferred preference for balance holds for women with four children though many differences are small and there are again a number of exceptions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, however, this is not the case, for there are as many positive as negative deviations in use.

The most important distinction between the data relating to stated desire to cease childbearing and those relating to contraceptive use lies in the statistical significance of the results. In the former case, the null hypothesis of no composition effects could be rejected in 17 countries with reasonable or high confidence. Composition effects on contraception are significant at the 0.1 level in only seven cases (Sri Lanka, Fiji, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Dominican Republic and Mexico). As noted earlier it is not surprising that significant effects are absent in the countries of Asia where contraceptive practice is still very low



Figure 3 Percentage of women currently using contraception

20



| | No of respondents | Percentage currently | Goodness of fit: p-values | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| | respondents | using | 'No composition effects' model | 'Symmetrical effects' model | |
| Africa | | adalah 1997 - Baran Baran Katalan Baran Katalan Baran Bar | | ан талан алан талан талан талар бай талар бай талар талан талар талар талар талар талар талар талар талар талар | |
| Kenya | 2018 | 8 | .5992 | | |
| Lesotho | 1181 | 8 | .8523 | | |
| Senegal | 1187 | 4 | .6895 | | |
| Sudan North | 1037 | 7 | .6645 | | |
| Jordan | 1047 | 26 | .6457 | | |
| Syria | 1419 | 25 | .1546 | | |
| Asia | | J | | | |
| Bangladesh | 2204 | 11 | .4251 | | |
| Nepal | 2189 | 3 | .1323 | | |
| Pakistan | 1612 | 7 | .7440 | | |
| Sri Lanka | 2330 | 40 | .0764 | .8320 | |
| Fiji | 1796 | 47 | .0793 | .1301 | |
| Indonesia | 3029 | 41 | .7359 | | |
| Korea | 2499 | 49 | .0000 | .0000 | |
| Malaysia | 2270 | 40 | .0132 | .0058 | |
| Philippines | 3719 | 49 | .0395 | .1362 | |
| Thailand | 1376 | 48 | .2332 | | |
| Americas | | | | | |
| Colombia | 1158 | 52 | .7684 | | |
| Paraguay | 994 | 51 | .1088 | | |
| Peru | 2150 | 40 | .3440 | | |
| Venezuela | 1008 | 61 | .3481 | | |
| Costa Rica | 1129 | 76 | .2723 | | |
| Dominican Republic | 672 | 42 | .0995 | .4534 | |
| Mexico | 2076 | 41 | .0317 | .0319 | |
| Panama | 1207 | 64 | .6321 | | |
| Guyana | 1159 | 34 | .3746 | | |
| Haiti | 697 | 26 | .3574 | | |
| Jamaica | 831 | 45 | .2506 | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1190 | 63 | .4053 | | |

Table 5 The effect of composition on current use of contraception: observed levels of significance (p-values) for two models

(Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan) or in the majority of Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries where attitudinal associations were not marked. On the other hand, the negative findings for Indonesia with previous evidence of a marked preference for balanced families and for Jordan and Syria, where previous data implied a strong son preference, are more surprising. A closer look at the Jordan and Syria results shows an implicit son preference among two-child families but little or no effect of composition at larger family sizes. There is no obvious explanation for this incongruity between the attitudinal and behavioural data.

We turn now to consider in more detail the nature of composition effects for those seven countries with statistically significant results. The dominant pattern implies a preference for sons. This is most strikingly apparent in Korea. Regardless of overall family size, the level of contraception is about 60 per cent among women with two sons; it falls to about 40 per cent for those with only one son and further to 30 per cent or lower with no sons. Pronounced effects of this nature are not found in the other countries. In Fiji, Malaysia, Philippines, Dominican Republic and Mexico, preferences for balance and for sons over daughters co-exist. Higher levels of use are typically found either among women with a balanced composition or with more boys than girls but rarely among the group with more girls. In none of these countries does the symmetrical effects model provide a good fit to the data. However, in seventh country, Sri Lanka, this model does provide a good fit. Thus, of the 28 countries, Sri Lanka is the only one where the degree of gender imbalance among children is related to the use of contraception but the direction of imbalance is immaterial.

2.5 RECENT FERTILITY

In the previous section, the association between the sex composition of families and current use of contraception was examined. We now examine the association with fertility itself. Previous studies of this nature have typically analysed parity progression ratios, by number of preceding

| | Woman-years | Birth rate per | Goodness of fit: p-valu | les |
|---------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | 1000 woman- years | 'No composition effects' model | 'Symmetrical effects' model |
| Africa | | | | |
| Kenya | 10071 | 325 | .2854 | |
| Lesotho | 5701 | 211 | .1445 | 4.mm* |
| Senegal | 5406 | 284 | .9846 | - Advent |
| Sudan (North) | 5055 | 282 | .9971 | |
| Jordan | 4916 | 364 | ,7330 | _ |
| Ѕугіа | 6230 | 335 | .2812 | |
| Asia | | , | | |
| Bangladesh | 10532 | 238 | .5565 | |
| Nepal | 9248 | 225 | .0714 | .0318 |
| Pakistan | 8093 | 264 | .0303 | .0091 |
| Sri Lanka | 11350 | 168 | .4605 | _ |
| Fiii | 7524 | 187 | .0210 | .0572 |
| Indonesia | 15398 | 173 | .5721 | |
| Котеа | 10828 | 152 | .0000 | .0000 |
| Malaysia | 10570 | - 185 | .0140 | .0353 |
| Philippines | 15466 | 237 | .0009 | .0407 |
| Thailand | 6633 | 178 | .4307 | |
| Americas | | | | |
| Colombia | 4941 | 182 | .4718 | |
| Paraguay | 4255 | 188 | .0356 | .0067 |
| Peru | 10147 | 234 | .2875 | · · · · · · |
| Venezuela | 4052 | 200 | .9067 | |
| Costa Rica | 4896 | 138 | .0716 | .5892 |
| Dominican Republic | 3044 | 228 | .1195 | |
| Mexico | 9708 | 261 | .0082 | .0010 |
| Panama | 5846 | 164 | .6089 | |
| Guyana | 4499 | 201 | .7904 | |
| Haiti | 3101 | 224 | .0769 | .3274 |
| Jamaica | 3961 | 179 | .0588 | .0283 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 4792 | . 119 | .0893 | .3299 |

Table 6The effect of composition on marital fertility in the five years preceding the survey: observed levels of significance(p-values) for two models

sons and daughters. In this study, we use marital fertility rates in the five-year period preceding the survey instead of progression ratios, mainly for reasons of computational ease. Fertility rates are defined as the number of births per thousand woman-years of exposure during the five-year period, where exposure includes all years lived following first marriage. Thus time spent in the divorced, separated or widowed state is counted in the denominator. For certain countries, rates were re-run on a 'within-marriage' exposure base, but no appreciable differences were observed. For the majority of countries, the average number of births over the whole five-year period is slightly in excess of one and therefore this measure of fertility corresponds closely with the Parity progression ratio.

Fertility rates are cross-classified by family size and composition at the start of the five-year period. This reconstruction of family characteristics was made possible by the birth history data in the standard recode files, which contain, for every child, the sex, the date of birth and, where applicable, the age at death.

The detailed results may be found in table A4 and their

statistical significance is summarized in table 6. In so far as contraception (including sterilization) is the dominant mode of birth control within marriage, we expect to find significant effects of composition on fertility to be confined to those countries where appreciable effects on contraception were previously observed.³ In a general way, this expectation is fulfilled but there are a number of very interesting exceptions.

As shown in table 6, family composition has no discernible effect on fertility in the countries of north and sub-Saharan Africa. This is consistent with the negative findings in regard to contraception.

In the Asian region, significant effects are again observed for Fiji, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines but not for Sri Lanka. More interestingly, however, composition appears to have an effect on the rate of childbearing in

³ It should be pointed out that, because fertility rates are classified by family size and composition at a point five years prior to the survey rather than by current size and composition, the distribution of individual cases among the cells of table A4 is quite different from their distribution in tables A2 and A3.



i. ..

Figure 4 Fertility rates

...

Nepal and Pakistan, both countries with very low levels of contraception but a pronounced preference for sons.

Among the Caribbean and Latin American countries, the association between composition and contraception was significant at the 0.1 level for only Dominican Republic and Mexico, though Paraguay also came close to this confidence level. In the case of fertility, highly significant effects can be noted for Mexico (p = 0.008) but not for Dominican Republic (p = 0.119). In addition, the results for Paraguay, Costa Rica and three Caribbean countries, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, are significant at the 0.1 level.

At first glance, it is puzzling to observe the greater number of statistically significant effects for fertility than for contraception. One reason may be the larger universe of observations for the analysis of fertility (based on all exposure since marriage) than for contraception (based on currently married, fecund women) which may just raise the results to statistical significance. A contributory reason for the discrepancy may be chance; the effects of composition on fertility in the seven countries where no effect on contraception was observed are not highly significant, with p-values ranging from 0.030 to 0.089, and thus there is a little under one in ten probability of the observed pattern of association arising by chance.

Three further possible explanations should be considered. First, there could be appreciable differences in the length of breastfeeding boys and girls, which in turn could influence the tempo of fertility. However, analysis of WFS data reveals small and generally non-significant differences and thus this possibility can be discounted (Smith and Ferry, forthcoming). Secondly, contraceptive use may have been under-reported in these surveys. There is independent evidence of such under-reporting in Pakistan (Vaessen 1981), but this explanation is unconvincing for the other countries. Thirdly, induced abortion may be widely used in these countries to regulate marital fertility. A previous analysis of WFS data has indicated that fertility levels in the Caribbean are much lower than predicted by the Bongaarts model from data on nuptiality, contraception and lactation (Cleland and Chidambaram 1981). Therefore the induced abortion hypothesis is plausible for Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence concerning levels of induced abortion in these countries so this line of argument must remain inconclusive.

We turn now to examine in more detail the nature and magnitude of effects, for those 12 countries where the results are statistically significant. We start with the four countries (Korea, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan) where the evidence of an effect of son preference on fertility is unmistakable. The results are summarized in figure 4. The magnitude of the effects for Korea far exceeds those for the other countries. At each family size, fertility rises steeply as the number of sons decreases below two. For instance, among Korean women who had four children at the start of the five-year period, those with only one son had twice the fertility rate of those who started with at least two sons, while women with no sons experienced a fertility rate three times as high.

In Malaysia, a preference for balance is indicated by the results for the two-child family, but at family sizes three and four fertility is heavily influenced by the number of surviving sons. Among women with three children, the fertility rate per thousand years of exposure rises monotonically from 152, 163, 186 to 215 births as the number of sons decreases. A similar gradient in fertility rates from 124 to 216 is apparent among women who started with four living children.

In view of their much lower levels of contraceptive practice, it is not surprising that composition effects on fertility are less strong in Nepal and Pakistan than in Korea or Malaysia. In Nepal, fertility rates per thousand womanyears rise from 235 to 260 with declining number of sons in two-child families and similarly, from about 200 to 255 among three-child families. In Pakistan, the strength of association is about the same as in Nepal at the two-child stage but is more pronounced for women with three children, rising from a rate of 200 to nearly 300.

For both Nepal and Pakistan, it is puzzling to note that the sex composition effect is more marked at smaller family sizes than at larger sizes. In these high fertility countries, the reverse would be more readily explicable because efforts to control family size are unlikely to begin until there are at least three or four surviving children. Despite the fact that sons and daughters are breastfed for similar durations, the possibility remains that family composition in Nepal and Pakistan affects the timing of births more than the number of births. The mechanism of the effect is presumably unreported birth control or coital frequency.

For the other eight countries with composition effects that are significant at the 0.1 level, the nature of effects is less clear cut and their magnitudes typically less than in the four cases discussed above. In Fiji, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, Paraguay and Mexico there is some evidence that couples respond to a deficit of sons by increased fertility. In Fiji, this tendency is confined to couples with small families and no sons. In the Philippines, a steep rise is observed in fertility from rates of 210 to 300 births per thousand woman years as the number of sons in three-child families decreases. However, among women with four children, the inferred preference for sons is less obvious, and among women with two children there is no discernible effect of composition at all. Thus, in this country, there is little evidence of any consistent preference effect.

In Trinidad and Tobago a slight preference for sons appears to co-exist with a desire for balance. Among women with two children, the fertility rates are 156, 121 and 187 for those with two, one and no sons. For women with three children, a fertility level of about 100 is recorded for those with more sons than daughters, while a rate of nearly 140 is recorded for those with more daughters. At family size four, however, composition effects are negligible. In Paraguay, a substantial son preference effect is observed for women with two children but little effect thereafter. Finally in Mexico, the associations between composition and fertility are small and evidence of son preference confined to family sizes two and three.

The three remaining countries with significant effects are Costa Rica, Haiti and Jamaica. In Costa Rica, the 'symmetrical effects' model fits well and thus a desire for balance appears to be the dominant force. For Haiti, the only clear finding is that couples with no daughters tend to have particularly high fertility. In Jamaica, also, the data for family size two and three are consistent with a preference for daughters.

3 Summary and Discussion

An attempt is made in table 7 to summarize the effects of family composition on reproductive attitudes and behaviour. In many respects the findings are consistent with previous evidence. For instance, the general absence of a preference for sons in Latin America and the possibility of a preference for daughters among Caribbean women have been noted by Williamson (1976). Similarly, the weak relationships in Thailand (Kamnuansilpa *et al* 1982), the absence of a son preference in Indonesia (Gille and Pardoko 1966), the strong son preference in Korea (Park 1978), in Malaysia (Coombs and Fernandez 1978), and in Pakistan (Khan and Sirageldin 1977) come as no surprise. There are however some genuinely new findings and some results which diverge from previous research. Hitherto, little was known about this subject in sub-Saharan Africa. The data presented here suggest little if any effect of parental sex preferences on reproductive attitudes in this region, although this generalization is based on only three countries and should be re-examined when the data from other WFS African surveys become available.

The findings for the Arab countries are more interesting. In her review, Williamson, using a system based on the sex ratios of ideal family sizes, rates women in rural Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia as having 'very strong son preference',

Table 7 Summary of main results

| | | Nature and magnitude of effects of composition on | | | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------|--|--|
| | Explicit sex preference | Stated desire to cease childbearing | Contraception | Marital fertility | | |
| Africa | | | | | | |
| Kenya | | | | استبد | | |
| Lesotho | Moderate son | | 44 (gm) | Annuar | | |
| Senegal | NA | NA | | | | |
| Sudan (North) | Moderate son | | | | | |
| Jordan | Strong son | Strong son | | manual 12 | | |
| Syria | Strong son | Strong son | | | | |
| Asia | | | | | | |
| Bangladesh | Strong son | Strong son | | | | |
| Nepal | Strong son | Strong son | | Moderate son | | |
| Pakistan | Strong son | Strong son | | Moderate son | | |
| Sri Lanka | Moderate son | Strong balance/son | Weak balance | | | |
| Fiji | Moderate son | Strong balance/son | Weak son | Weak son | | |
| Indonesia | | Strong balance | | | | |
| Korea | Strong son | Strong son | Very strong son | Very strong son | | |
| Malaysia | Moderate son | Strong balance/son | Strong son | Strong son | | |
| Philippines | - | Strong balance | Moderate son | Weak son | | |
| Thailand | Moderate son | Moderate balance/son | | - | | |
| Americas | | | | | | |
| Colombia | | | | | | |
| Paraguay | | | | Weak son | | |
| Peru | | | | | | |
| Venezuela | Daughter | Moderate balance | | | | |
| Costa Rica | | | • | Balance | | |
| Dominican Republic | Moderate son | | Weak son | | | |
| Mexico | Moderate son | Strong balance/son | Moderate son | Weak son | | |
| Panama | | Moderate balance | | and the | | |
| Guyana | | Moderate balance | _ | | | |
| Haiti | | | | Weak daughter | | |
| Jamaica | Daughter | | | Weak daughter | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | | Strong balance/son | | Weak son | | |

stronger even than in Korea. Though in the present study different countries were examined, the attitudinal data on the preferred sex of the next child and on the desire to limit family size also provided evidence of a very strong preference for sons in the Arab region. Despite this, little or no effect of family composition on contraception or on fertility was observed for either Jordan or Syria. Admittedly, fertility is still very high in these two countries and it is possible that contraception is used more for spacing than for limitation. Nevertheless the pattern suggests at least the possibility that the pro-son sentiments of Arab wives are misleading, in the sense that they do not exert any influence on reproductive behaviour. It will be interesting to examine in due course the results of WFS surveys in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt to check whether this tentative conclusion is valid for the entire Arab region.

In Asia, the most important finding is that a lack of sons in Nepal and Pakistan engenders a positive fertility response. This is a remarkable result and contradicts the common assertion that a preference for sons is only likely to affect fertility in countries where the overall level of fertility is moderate and birth control widespread. Nevertheless, together with the attitudinal evidence, we may conclude that a preference for sons is an important determinant of behaviour in both Nepal and Pakistan. So far, the effect on fertility is modest but as birth control becomes more common, it will almost certainly increase. The Korean data indicate the very great effect that a desire for at least two sons can have on marital fertility and it is possible that such countries as Pakistan and Nepal will follow the same path as Korea.

For the remaining WFS country of the Indian subcontinent, Bangladesh, the results are less clear cut. The attitudinal data portray a strong preference for sons, a finding consistent with other research (Ahmed 1981). However, the relationships between composition and contraception or fertility, though in the expected direction, were not statistically significant.

Another interesting finding to emerge from the Asian region concerns such countries as Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In these countries, a strong and essentially symmetrical effect of family composition on self-declared desire to limit family size was observed. However, the effect of composition on behaviour was either very minor or took the form of an implied preference for sons in addition to a desire for balance. The explanation for this inconsistency between the attitudinal and behavioural results may lie in the influence of husbands or other family members, about whose views we know nothing. It also seems possible that the desire for a balanced family composition, though prevalent in many countries, is not a sufficiently compelling goal to affect reproductive behaviour. One of the most striking features of table 7 is the lack of statistically significant composition effects of a symmetrical nature on contraception or fertility.

In conclusion, this analysis has shown that a stated preference for sons is far from universal in developing countries and, even where it exists, it is tempered by the desire for at least one daughter. More importantly, appreciable effects of family composition on reproductive behaviour have been discerned in only a few of the 28 countries. These general conclusions are consistent with the findings of other cross-national analyses (Repetto 1972; Freedman and Coombs 1974). Only in Korea, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, is there evidence that a desire for sons sustains an appreciably higher level of fertility than would otherwise be the case, though in Nepal and Pakistan this desire may impede future declines in fertility.

These statements should immediately be placed in a wider context. The two most populous countries of the world, China and India, are not represented in this study. There is evidence in both cases of a strong son preference and thus the importance of this topic in global terms may be much greater than suggested above. Though these two countries are excluded from the study, Malaysia has sizeable Chinese and Indian minorities while Fiji, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago contain large proportions of the population whose predecessors came from the Indian subcontinent. Though not presented in this report, separate analysis of these ethnic groups has been done. It reveals clearly that the son preference inferred for Malaysia can be almost entirely attributed to the population of Chinese descent. Whereas highly significant effects of composition on both contraception and fertility were found for this community (p < 0.003), effects for the Malays and Indians were not significant (p > 0.1). As similar results have been reported recently for Taiwan (Chang et al 1981), we may conclude that a son preference persists among Chinese communities, even in the face of major economic and educational transformations. The possible implications for the one-child family policy in the Republic of China are obvious. A completely contrary conclusion may be drawn from the results for the four Indian expatriate populations. In only one instance (the fertility of Indians in Fiji) is a statistically significant effect of composition on contraception or fertility found.

References

Ahmed, N.R. (1981). Family Size and Sex Preferences among Women in Rural Bangladesh. Studies in Family Planning 12 (3): 100-9.

Baker, R.J. and J.A. Nelder (1978). *The GLIM System: Release 3.* Oxford: Numerical Algorithms Group.

Ben-Porath, Y. and F. Welch (1976). Do Sex Preferences Really Matter? *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 90: 285-307.

Chang, M.C., R. Freedman and T.H. Sun (1981). Trends in Fertility, Family Size Preferences, and Family Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961–1980. *Studies in Family Planning* 12 (5): 211–32.

Cleland, J.G. and V.C. Chidambaram (1981). Contribution of WFS to an Understanding of Fertility Determinants and Trends. Paper presented at IUSSP Conference, Manila, Dec. 1981.

Coombs, C.H., L.C. Coombs and G.H. McClelland (1975). Preference Scales for Number and Sex of Children. *Population Studies 29*: 273-98.

Coombs, L.C. and D. Fernandez (1978). Husband-Wife Agreement about Reproductive Goals. *Demography 15 (1)*: 57-73.

Freedman, R. and L.C. Coombs (1974). Cross Cultural Comparisons: Data on Two Factors in Fertility Behaviour. New York: The Population Council.

Gille, H. and R.H. Pardoko (1966). A Family Life Study in East Java: Preliminary Findings. In B. Berelson, ed. Family Planning and Population Programmes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hobcraft, J.N., J.M. McDonald and S.O. Rutstein (1982). Socio-Economic Differentials in Infant and Child Mortality: a Cross-National Comparison. Paper presented at PAA meeting, San Diego. Kamnuansilpa, Peerasit, Aphichat Chamratrithirong and John Knodel (1982). Thailand's Reproductive Revolution: an Update. *International Family Planning Perspectives 8* (2): 51--6.

Khan, A.M. and I. Sirageldin (1977). Son Preference and the Demand for Additional Children in Pakistan. *Demography 14 (4)*: 481–95.

Lightbourne, Robert, Susheela Singh and Cynthia P. Green (1982). The World Fertility Survey: Charting Global Childbearing. *Population Reference Bureau* 37(1).

Little, R.J.A. (1978). Generalized Linear Models for Cross-Classified Data from the WFS. WFS Technical Bulletins no 5.

McClelland, G.H. (1979). Determining the Impact of Sex Preferences on Fertility: a Consideration of Parity Progression Ratio, Dominance and Stopping Rule Measures. Demography 16 (2): 377-88.

Markle, G.E. (1974). Sex Ratio at Birth: Values, Variance and Some Determinants. *Demography 11 (1)*: 131-42.

Park, C.B. (1978). The Fourth Korean Child: the Effect of Son Preference on Subsequent Fertility. *Journal of Biosocial Sciences* 10: 95-106.

Repetto, R. (1972). Son Preference and Fertility Behaviour in Developing Countries. Studies in Family Planning. 3(4): 70-6.

Smith, D.P. and B. Ferry (forthcoming). Correlates of Breastfeeding. WFS Comparative Studies.

Vaessen, M. (1981). Knowledge of Contraceptives: an Assessment of World Fertility Survey Data Collection Procedures. *Population Studies 35 (3)*: 357-73.

Williamson, N.E. (1976). Sons or Daughters: a Cross-Cultural Survey of Parental Preferences. Beverley Hills, California: Sage.

Appendix A-Detailed Tables



| Compo- | Preference | Number | of living | Children | | Compo- | Preference | Number | of living | g Children |
|----------------|-------------------|--------|-----------|-------------|----|------------|-------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------|
| sition | , | 2 | 3 | 4 | | sition | | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| KENYA | | | | | | LESOTHO | | | | |
| A11 | Boy | 5 | 1 | o*1 | | A11 | Boy | 7 | (5) | 0*] |
| boys | Girl | 47 | 54 | 61* | | boys | Girl | 73 | (82) | 100* |
| | Undecided | 48 | 45 | 39* | 5 | | Undecided | 20 | (13) | 0* 5 |
| 311 but | Deve | | 0 | < | 54 | | Bow | | 22 | (7) > 84 |
| All but | BOY Girl | _ | 32 | 52 | 41 | ODe | Girl | - | 62 | (78) |
| boys | Undecided | | 60 | 42 | | boys | Undecided | | 16 | (15) |
| - | | | | , | | | | | | 5 |
| _ | Воу | 21 | | 14 | | / | Boy | 56 | | 46 |
| Balance | Girl | 19 | - | 18 | | Balance | Girl Underided | 18 | - | 23 |
| | Undecided | 60 | | 66 | | | Oldecided | 20 | | 21 |
| All but | Boy | | 37 | 42 | | All but | Воу | | 79 | (77) |
| one | Girl | - | 6 | 2 | | one | Girl | - | 5 | (4) |
| girls | Undecided | | 57 | 56 (| 44 | girls | Undecided | | 16 | (19) (80 |
| | Devi | | 60 | (52) | 2 | 114 | Boy | 86 | (89) | 92* |
| airls | Girl | 3 | 2 | (0) | 34 | girls | Girl | 3 | (2) | 0* |
| 91110 | Undecided | 42 | 29 | (48) | | <u> </u> | Undecided | 11 | (9) | 8* |
| | | | | , | | | | | | · |
| SUDAN (NO | RTH) | | | | | JORDAN | | | | |
| | | | (0) | 1 | | | Pou | 11 | (16) | ۶ * ا |
| ALL | BOY | 59 | (9) | 69* | | hovs | Girl | 61 | (52) | 69* |
| boys | Undecided | 30 | (18) | 23* | 20 | 5612 | Undecided | 28 | (32) | 25* 14 |
| | | | | > | 47 | | | | | > 30 |
| All but | Воу | | 31 | 23 | 33 | All but | Boy | | 25 | (16) 56 |
| one | Girl Underided | - | 36 | 42 | | one | Giri Undecided | - | 57 | (10) |
| boys | Undecided | | 22 | 33 J | | 5012 | onacoraca | | | (10),] |
| | Воу | 47 | | 39 | | | Воу | 32 | | 41 |
| Balance | Girl | 14 | - | 13 | | Balance | Girl | 4 | - | 3 |
| | Undecided | 39 | | 48 | | | Undecided | 64 | | 56 |
| All but | Boy | | 63 | 60] | | All but | Boy | | 55 | 73 |
| one | Girl | - | 7 | 2 | | one | Girl | - | 1 | 0 |
| girls | Undecided | | 30 | 38 | 67 | girls | Undecided | | 44 | 27 76 |
| | | | | 5 | 1 | | _ | | (70) | |
| All | Boy | 75 | (78) | 85* | 32 | All | Boy | 69 | (79) | 93* 24 |
| girls | GITI | 25 | (0) | 15* | | giris | Undecided | 30 | (21) | 7* |
| | Undecided | 25 | (22) | 13, 1 | | | Undeoracu | 50 | () | j |
| SYRIA | | | | | | BANGLADESH | | | | |
| | | | | . 1 | | | - | | | , ₇₊ 1 |
| A11 | Boy | 21 | (20) | 17* | | All | Boy | 21 | 4× 74* | 50* |
| boys | GITI Undecided | 46 | (54) | 33* | 27 | boys | Undecided | 33 | 22* | 33* 23* |
| | ondecraed | 55 | (20) | J S | 27 | | | | | > 23* |
| All but | Воу | | 42 | (31) | 46 | All but | Воу | | 45 | 29* 54* |
| one | Girl | - | 14 | (18) | | one | Girl | - | 10 | 0* |
| boys | Undecided | | 44 | (51) | | boys | Undecided | | 45 | /1~J |
| | Pov | 47 | | 38 | | | Boy | 63 | | 50* |
| Balance | Girl | 2 | - | 1 | | Balance | Girl | 1 | - | 4* |
| | Undecided | 51 | | 61 | | | Undecided | 36 | | 46* |
| | | | | 1 | | | | | 63 | 741 |
| All but | Boy | | 74 | 79 | | All but | Boy | _ | 63 | 0* |
| one | Girl | - | 2 | 21 | 80 | girls | Undecided | - | 37 | 26* (83) |
| ATT 12 | undecided | | 24 | " (| 0 | 91110 | | | | > (0) |
| A11 | Воу | 80 | (89) | 82* | 20 | All | Boy | 88 | (98) | 100* (17) |
| girls | Girl | 0 | (0) | 0* | | girls | Girl | 0 | (0) | 0* |
| | Undecided | 20 | (11) | 18* | | | Undecided | 12 | (2) | 0~) |

Table A1Of currently married, fecund women who want another child, the percentage who want another boy, a girl or areundecided, by number and sex composition of living children

Notes to table A1 appear on p35.

| Compo- sition | Preference | <u>Number</u> 2 | of livin 3 | g Children 4 | | Compo- sition | Preference | <u>Number</u> 2 | r of living 3 | g Children 4 |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| NEPAL | | | | | | PAKISTAN | | | | |
| | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| A11 | Boy | 23 | 7 | 0* | | All | Воу | 35 | 14* | 25* |
| boys | Girl Undecided | 48 29 | 69 24 | 88* | (26) | boys | Girl Undecided | 31 34 | 54* 32* | 42* 33* (45) |
| | _ | | | <u> </u> | (41) | | _ | | | > (19) |
| All but | Boy | | 44 | 37* | (33) | All but | Boy | | 52 | 58* (36) |
| one boys | Undecided | - | 40 | 42* | | one boys | Undecided | - | 44 | 37* |
| | | | | J | | , 1 | | | | , |
| Balanco | Boy | 68 2 | _ | (63) | | Balance | Boy | 74 | _ | (59) |
| Batance | Undecided | 30 | | (32) | | Barance | Undecided | 25 | | (41) |
| | - | | | (05) | | | D | | 0.0 | ••] |
| All but | Boy Girl | _ | 87 | (86) | | All but | BOY Girl | - | 88 0 | 0 |
| girls | Undecided | | 13 | (12) | 92 | girls | Undecided | | 12 | 7 95 |
| | Dava | 01 | 0.0 | (100) > | 1 | | Devi | 0.9 | (100) | 100+ > 0 |
| airls | BOY Girl | 91 | 99 | (100) | / | airls | Girl | 90 | (100) | 0* |
| giris | Undecided | 8 | 1 | (0) | | 91110 | Undecided | 2 | (0) | 0* |
| | | | | J | | | | | | 2 |
| SRI LANKA | | | | | | FIJI | | | | |
| A11 | Boy | 1 | (3) | 0* | | A11 | Boy | 3 | 3 | 0*] |
| boys | Girl | 92 | (91) | 100* | | boys | Girl | 89 | 95 | 100* |
| - | Undecided | 7 | (6) | 0*(| 0* | Undecided | | 8 | 2 | 0* (5) |
| All but | Boy | | (26) | 0* | 83* 17* | All but | Boy | | 14 | (7) (88) |
| one | Girl | - | (34) | 67* | 17- | one | Girl | - | 61 | (82) |
| boys | Undecided | | (40) | 33 * | | boys | Undecided | | 25 | (11) |
| | Boy | 55 | | 50* | | | Воу | 39 | | (31) |
| Balance | Girl | 10 | - | 0* | | Balance | Girl | 17 | - | (28) |
| | Undecided | 35 | | 50* | | | Undecided | 44 | | (41) |
| All but | Воу | | 80 | 81* | | All but | Воу | | 70 | (81) |
| one | Girl | - | 2 | 0* | | one | Girl | - | 4 | (2) |
| girls | Undecided | | 18 | 19* | (90) | girls | Undecided | | 26 | (17) 85 2 |
| A11 | Воу | 97 | (92) | 100* | (10) | A11 | Воу | 91 | (98) | 100* 13 |
| girls | Girl | 2 | (0) | 0* | | girls | Girl | 3 | (0) | 0* |
| | Undecided | 1 | (8) | (*۵ | | | Undecided | 6 | (2) | 0*J |
| INDONESIA | | | | | | KOREA | | | | |
| | _ | | | 1 | | | Devi | 2 | 12* | o+] |
| All | Boy | 1 83 | 3 | 91 * | | boys | Girl | 91 | 88* | 0* |
| boys | Undecided | 16 | 12 | 9* | | boys | Undecided | 7 | 0* | 0* 50* |
| A11 but | Pou | | 8 | 2 | 1 73 | All but | Boy | | 23* | 50* 0* |
| one | Girl | - | 55 | 64 (| 26 | one | Girl | - | 31* | 50* |
| boys | Undecided | | 37 | 34 | | boys | Undecided | | 46* | 0*∫ |
| | Boy | 28 | | ر 15 | | | Воу | 81 | | 71* |
| Balance | Girl | 18 | - | 23 | | Balance | Girl | 1 | - | 0* |
| | Undecided | 54 | | 62 | | | Undecided | 18 | | 29* |
| All but | Воу | | 57 | 56 | | All but | Воу | | (100) | (100) |
| one | Girl | - | 8 | 7 | | one | Girl | - | (0) | (0) |
| girls | Undecided | | 35 | 37 | 65 6 | girls | Undecided | | (0) | (0) (100) |
| A11 | Воу | 81 | 80 | (86) | 29 | All | Воу | 99 | (100) | 100* (0) |
| girls | Girl | 0 | 4 | (3) | | girls | Girl | 0 | (0) | 0* |
| | Undecided | 19 | 16 | (11) | | | Undecided | 1 | (0) | 0*) |

Table A1(cont)

```
Table A1(cont)
```

| Compo- | Preference | Number | of living | Children | | Compo- | Preference | Number | of living | g Children |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|--|
| sition | | 2 | 3 | 4 | | sition | | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| MALAYSIA | | | | | | PHILIPPINES | 3 | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 2 82 16 | 0 88 12 | 0* 82* 18* | 4 | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 1 89 10 | 0 95 5 | (0) (96) (4) 2 |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 11 54 35 | 6 71 23 | 74 22 | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 5 65 30 | 3 66 31 |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 35 16 49 | - | 32 21 47 | | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 25 30 45 | - | 32 30 38 |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 66 4 30 | 77 2 21 | 77 | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 71 4 25 | $ \begin{array}{c} 62\\ 4\\ 34 \end{array} $ 71 3 |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 81 0 19 | 86 0 14 | (77) (0)- (23) | 21 | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 84 1 15 | 93 0 7 | 100* 26 0* 0* |
| THAILAND | | | | - | | COLOMBIA | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 1 94 5 | 0* 95* 5* | 0* 100* 0* | 0* | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 2 91 7 | 0* 94* 6* | 0* 100* 0* 17* |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (21) (67) (12) | 0* 78* 22* | 14* | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (18) (75) (7) | 21* 53* 26* |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 53 17 30 | - | 42* 29* 29* | | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 38 42 20 | - | 25* 50* 25* |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 71 8 21 | 91* 0* 9* | 93* | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (80) (8) (12) | 90* 0* 10* 83* |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 98 0 2 | 100* 0* 0* | 100* 0* 0* | 7* | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 87 7 6 | 94* 0* 6* | 50* 0* 50* |
| PARAGUAY | | | | | | PERU | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 8 82 10 | (4) (88) (8) | 0* 100* 0* | (5) | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 7 81 12 | (10) (68) (22) | 0* 100* 0* (3) |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 8 60 32 | (6) (80) (14) | (12) | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 9 74 17 | $ \begin{array}{c} (4)\\ (82)\\ (14) \end{array} $ |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 20 33 47 | - | (31) (17) (52) | | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 37 25 38 | - | (45) (14) (41) |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 59 11 30 | (78) (7) (15) | (78) | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 70 10 20 | (39) (0) (61) (42) (2) |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 86 6 8 | 94* 0* 6* | 80* 0* 20* | (16) | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 87 1 12 | (82) (4) (14) | $ \begin{array}{c} 50*\\ 10*\\ 40* \end{array} $ |

33

Table A1(cont)

| | Preference | Number | of living | Children | Compo- | Preference | Number of living Children | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|
| sition | Preference | 2 | 3 | 4 | sition | Preference | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
| VENEZUELA | <u>, , ,</u> | | | | COSTA RICA | | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 4 90 6 | 0* 90* 10* | 0* 83* 17* 0* | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 5 78 17 | 5* 79* 16* | 14* 72* 14* | 12* |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (3) (75) (22) | 0* 92* 8* | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 10 58 32 | 12* 59* 29* | 63* 25* |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 22 42 36 | - | 22* 45* 33* | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 20 19 61 | | (16) (19) (65) | |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (60) (14) (26) | 56* 22* 22* (67) | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 57 9 34 | 75* 0* 25* | 76* 5* |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 81 8 11 | 82* 0* 18* | $ \begin{array}{c} 100*\\ 0*\\ 0* \end{array} $ (16) | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 81 7 12 | 95* 5* 0* | 80* 20* 0* | 19* |
| DOMINICAN | REPUBLIC | | | | MEXICO | | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | (10) (85) (5) | 0* 71* 29* | 0* 100* 0* 5* | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 8 80 12 | (5) (86) (9) | 8* 69* 23* | 7 |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (15) (82) (3) | 6* 76* 18* | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 13 58 29 | (7) (53) (40) | 36 |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 27 56 17 | - | 42* 33* 25* | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 33 18 49 | - | 37 15 48 | |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Uņdecided | - | (68) (20) (12) | 71* 29* 0* 70* | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 66 7 27 | 71 4 25 | 75 |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | (87) (6) (7) | 90* 0* 10* | 67* 0* 33* | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 73 4 23 | (70) (8) (22) | 92* 8* 0* | 21 |
| PANAMA | | | | | GUYANA | | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 3 93 4 | 0* 100* 0* | 0* 75* 25* 0* | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 2 84 14 | (0) (92) (8) | 0* 100* 0* | 4* 96* |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (23) (61) (16) | 0* 83* 17* | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (17) (63) (20) | 7* 93* 0* | 0* |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 28 44 28 | - | 38* 37* 25* | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 33 22 45 | - | (29) (37) (34) | |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (70) (13) (17) | 80* 5* 15* (85) | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (71) (13) (16) | 76* 5* 19* | 79* 4* |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | (85) (4) (11) | 88* 0* 12* | 100* 0* 0* | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | (87) (2) (11) | 85* 5* 10* | 100* 0* 0* | 17* |

Table A1(cont)

| Compo- sition | Preference | <u>Number</u> 2 | of living 3 | g Children 4 | | Compo- sition | Preference | <u>Numbe</u> 2 | er of livin 3 | ng Children 4 |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| HAITI | | | | | | JAMAICA | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | (0) (86) (14) | 0* 100* 0* | 0* 100* 0* | 0* | All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | (2) (92) (6) | 0* 100* 0* | 17* 83* 0* 12* |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (0) (32) (68) | 0* 60* 40* | 33* | All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (14) (70) (16) | 11* 72* 17* |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 26 16 58 | - | 0* 10* 90* | | Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 21 61 18 | - | 35* 50* 15* |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | 35* 4* 61* | 13* 0* 87* | 22* | All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (76) (12) (12) | 50* 33* 17* 50* |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | (81) (0) (19) | 50* 0* 50* | 100* 0* 0* | 78* | All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | (69) (7) (24) | 100* 0* 0* | 0* 0* 0* 0* |
| TRINIDAD & | TOBAGO | | | | | | | | | |
| All boys | Boy Girl Undecided | 5 88 7 | 0* 90* 10* | 11* 89* 0* | 12* | | | | | |
| All but one boys | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (14) (67) (19) | 13* 87* 0* | 88* 0* | | | | | |
| Balance | Boy Girl Undecided | 25 29 46 | - | 28* 50* 22* | | | | | | |
| All but one girls | Boy Girl Undecided | - | (87) (9) (4) | 100* 0* 0* | 90* 5+ | | | | | |
| All girls | Boy Girl Undecided | 93 1 6 | 94* 0* 6* | 60* 20* 20* | 5* | | | | | |

Figures in brackets, n = 50 or less Figures with asterisks, n = 25 or less

| Composition | Number | of living | g children | Composition | Number | Number of living children | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | |
| KENYA | | | | LESOTHO | | | | | | |
| All boys All but one boys | 17 | 14 20 | $\binom{(23)}{38}$ 36 | All boys All but one boys | 9 | (18) 16 | 20* 24 23 | | | |
| Balance | 12 | - | 33 | Balance | 10 | - | 25 J | | | |
| All but one girls | - | 21 | 25 26 | All but one girls | - | 14 | $30 \rightarrow 29$ | | | |
| All girls | 11 | 14 | (31) | All girls | 5 | (13) | 27~j | | | |
| TOTAL | 13 | 19 | 32 | TOTAL | 8 | 15 | 26 | | | |
| | | | | , | | | | | | |
| SUDAN (NORTH) | | | | JORDAN | | | | | | |
| All boys | 13 | (13) | 15* 24 | All boys | 22 | (40) | 50 * 52 | | | |
| All but one boys | - | 19 | 26 | All but one boys | - | 36 | 53 5 | | | |
| Balance | 14 | - | 21 1 | Balance | 23 | - | 43 | | | |
| All but one girls | - 14 | (17) | 21 > 16 | All but one girls All girls | - 8 | (26) | 28 > 28 25* 28 | | | |
| nii gilio | 14 | (17) | ۰J | init girlo | C C | (20) | J | | | |
| TOTAL | 14 | 15 | 21 | TOTAL | 19 | 29 | 42 | | | |
| SYRIA | | | | BANGLADESH | | | | | | |
| | | | 1 | | | - | | | | |
| All boys | 20 | 35 | $\binom{(44)}{55} > 53$ | All boys | 75 | /8 | (85) > 95 | | | |
| Balance | 20 | - | 60 | Balance | 78 | _ | 90 | | | |
| All but one girls | - | 27 | 48 \ 45 | All but one girls | - | 79 | 88 85 | | | |
| All girls | 9 | 17* | 31*∫ | All girls | 59 | 59 | (67) | | | |
| TOTAL | 18 | 34 | 54 | TOTAL | 73 | 80 | 90 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| NEPAL | | | 2 | PAKISTAN | | | 1 | | | |
| All boys | 42 | 50 | (73) 84 | All boys | 39 | 61 | (75) 81 | | | |
| All but one boys | - | 66 | 86 ∫ | All but one boys | - | 65 | 84 5 | | | |
| Balance | 38 | - | 81 62 1 | Balance | 32 | - | 73 | | | |
| All dut one giris | 14 | 53 16 | $\binom{62}{(9)} > 51$ | All but one girls | - 6 | (6) | ⁴² > 39 | | | |
| TOTAL | 34 | 53 | 73 | TOTAL | 29 | 45 | 66 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| SRI LANKA | | | | FIJI | | | | | | |
| All boys | 45 | 68 | (73) 80 | All boys | 35 | 40 | (65) 71 | | | |
| All but one boys | - | 87 | 93 | All but one boys | - | 62 | 73 / 1 | | | |
| Balance | 69 | - | 94 | Balance | 43 | - | 84 1 | | | |
| All but one girls | 40 | 78 | $\binom{90}{(59)} > 84$ | All but one girls | - | 56 | $\binom{72}{43}$ 68 | | | |
| ATT 91119 | 40 | 43 | (19)] | ALL GIELS | 20 | 52 | 43*J | | | |
| TOTAL | 56 | 76 | 89 | TOTAL | 38 | 53 | 75 | | | |

Table A2 The percentage of currently married, fecund, non-pregnant women who want no more children,^a by number and sex composition of living children

^a The category "want no more children" includes those women who are sterilized

Table A2(cont)

| Composition | Number | of living | children | Composition | Number of living children | | | |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|------|-----------------|--|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
| INDONESIA | | | | KOREA | | | | |
| All boys | 28 | 44 | (55) 70 | All boys | 77 | 93 | و ∫ (100) | |
| All but one boys | - | 64 | 75 | All but one boys | - | 97 | 99 | |
| Balance | 44 | - | 83 | Balance | 72 | - | 97 | |
| All but one girls | - | 65 | 72 68 | All but one girls | _ | 83 | 82 5 7 | |
| All girls | 36 | 47 | 56 { | All girls | 38 | 48 | (58) | |
| TOTAL | 38 | 60 | 74 | TOTAL | 68 | 89 | 93 | |
| MALAYSIA | | | | PHILIPPINES | | | | |
| All boys | 17 | 28 | (41) 56 | All boys | 33 | 51 | 62 } 7 | |
| All but one boys | - | 44 | 59 | All but one boys | - | 71 | 76 (| |
| Balance | 26 | - | 68 | Balance | 52 | - | 85 1 | |
| All but one girls | - | 31 | 44 39 | All but one girls | - | 65 | 82 > 7 | |
| All girls | 18 | 15 | 8* | All girls | 31 | 46 | (56) | |
| TOTAL | 22 | 34 | 56 | TOTAL | 42 | 64 | 79 | |
| THAILAND | | | | COLOMBIA | | | | |
| All boys | 53 | (59) | 78* <mark>89</mark> | All boys | 50 | (58) | 73*L 7 | |
| All but one boys | - | 81 | 92 | All but one boys | - | 71 | 75 | |
| Balance | 58 | - | 86 J | Balance | 55 | - | 82 | |
| All but one girls | - | 70 | 88 > 88 | All but one girls | - | 65 | 82 > 8 | |
| All girls | 41 | (65) | 88*∫ | All girls | 47 | (55) | 85*∫ | |
| TOTAL | 53 | 72 | 88 | TOTAL | 52 | 66 | 80 | |
| PARAGUAY | | | | PERU | | | | |
| N11 hours | 22 | (20) | cr+1 | | 40 | 50 | (77) | |
| All but one hove | 22 | 38 | $39^{2} > 45$ | All but one hour | 49 | 71 | 7777 | |
| Balance | 25 | - | 39 j 49 | Balance | 55 | - | 79 | |
| All but one girls | - | 37 | (45) 1 50 | All but one girls | _ | 68 | 77 1 7 | |
| All girls | 25 | (38) | 70* | All girls | 47 | 63 | (75) | |
| TOTAL | 24 | 37 | 48 | TOTAL | 52 | 67 | 77 | |
| VENEZUELA | | | | COSTA RICA | | | | |
| All boys | 20 | (53) | 75* | All hours | 30 | (57) | 71*1 - | |
| All but one hove | | 74 | 78 78 | All but one hove | 54 | 61 | 74 7 | |
| Balance | 52 | _ | 80 | Balance | 40 | - | 67 | |
| All but one girls | - | 63 | 86 85 | All but one girls | - | 61 | 77 \ 7 | |
| All girls | 34 | (64) | 77* | All girls | 40 | (50) | 67 * ∫ ′ | |
| TOTAL | 44 | 67 | 81 | TOTAL | 38 | 59 | 72 | |

Table A2(cont)

| Composition | Number | of living | g children | Composition | Number of living childr | | | |
|---------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------|-----------|--|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
| OMINICAN REPUBLIC | | | | MEXICO | | | | |
| All boys | 40 | 73* | 90* 73 | All boys | 37 | 48 | (55) | |
| All but one boys | - | 64 | 69 | All but one boys | - | 61 | 68 | |
| Balance | 30 | - | 78 | Balance | 41 | - | 74 | |
| All but one girls | - | 70 | (83) 5 80 | All but one girls | - | 47 | 64 | |
| All girls | 46 | 47* | 70*∫ | All girls | 32 | 47 | (56) | |
| TOTAL | 37 | 66 | 77 | TOTAL | 38 | 53 | 68 | |
| | | | | , | | | | |
| PANAMA | | | | GUYANA | | | | |
| All boys | 38 | 71 | 80* 84 | All boys | 40 | 56 | 63* | |
| All but one boys | | 79 | 85 | All but one boys | - | 71 | 74 | |
| Balance | 51 | - | 87 | Balance | 55 | - | 73 | |
| All but one girls | - | 71 | 74 75 | All but one girls | - | 72 | 74 | |
| All girls | 38 | (59) | (77) | All girls | 51 | (39) | 80* | |
| FOTAL | 45 | 73 | 82 | TOTAL | 50 | 66 | 73 | |
| HAITI | | | | JAMAICA | | | | |
| All boys | 50 | (68) | 86* | | 49 | 57* | £0+ | |
| All but one boys | 52 | (00) | (88) (88) | All but one bour | 40 | 50 | 60^ 6C | |
| Balance | 50 | - | (77) | Balance | 46 | | 69 | |
| All but one girls | - | 74 | (83) | All but one girls | - | 71 | (66) | |
| All girls | 47 | 79* | 90* | All girls | 57 | (61) | 100* | |
| FOTAL | 50 | 70 | 83 | TOTAL | 49 | 64 | 68 | |
| TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO | | | | | | | | |
| All boys | 48 | (57) | (68) | | | | | |
| All but one boys | - | 75 | (82) | | | | | |
| Balance | 52 | - | 84 1 | | | | | |
| all but one girls | - | 61 | 80 > 76 | | | | | |
| All girls | 40 | (52) | 55*∫ | | | | | |
| የርመስ T | 49 | 65 | 80 | | | | | |

Figures in brackets, n = 50 or less Figures with asterisks, n = 25 or less

| Composition | Number | of living | g Children | Composition | Number of living Children | | | | |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|------|------------------------------------|--|--|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | | |
| KENYA | | | _ | LESOTHO | | | | | |
| All boys | 11 | 12 | (13) \ 10 | All boys | 8 | (15) | 10* > 8 | | |
| All but one boys | - | 10 | 9 J | All but one boys | - | 8 | 7 5 | | |
| All but one girls | 5 | - | 61 | Balance | 6 | 10 | 13 1 | | |
| All girls | 7 | 10 | (6) > 6 | All girls | 6 | 8 | $\frac{11}{11*}$ (11) | | |
| TOTAL | 7 | 10 | 8 | TOTAL | 6 | 10 | , 11 | | |
| | | | | , | | | | | |
| SENEGAL | | | | SUDAN (NORTH) | | | | | |
| All boys | 5 | 6 | 0*\ _ | All boys | 8 | 9 | 6*1 <u>5</u> | | |
| All but one boys | - | 5 | 5 (| All but one boys | - | 10 | 5 | | |
| Balance | 4 | - | 5 1 | Balance | 8 | - | 9 1 | | |
| All but one girls | - | 3 | 1 > 1 | All but one girls | - | 9 | 6 > 5 | | |
| All girls | 5 | 3 | (0) | All girls | 2 | (6) | 5*∫ | | |
| TOTAL | 5 | 4 | 3 | TOTAL | 7 | 9 | 7 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| JORDAN | | | | SYRIA | | | | | |
| All boys | 33 | (33) | (21) | All boys | 25 | 21 | (22)] | | |
| All but one boys | - | 28 | $\binom{21}{27} > \frac{25}{25}$ | All but one boys | - | 29 | $\binom{(33)}{26} > \frac{28}{28}$ | | |
| Balance | 22 | _ | 29 | Balance | 21 | _ | 31 J | | |
| All but one girls | - | 25 | 23 23 | All but one girls | _ | 25 | 27 2 24 | | |
| All girls | 26 | (22) | 24*∫ | All girls | 17 | (17) | 6* | | |
| TOTAL | 26 | 27 | 26 | TOTAL | 22 | 25 | 28 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| BANGLADESH | | | 2 | NEPAL | | | | | |
| All boys | 10 | 8 | (13) \ 15 | All boys | 3 | 4 | (3)] = | | |
| All but one boys | - | 13 | 16 5 | All but one boys | - | 4 | $\left 6 \right\rangle$ | | |
| Balance | 9 | | ¹³ 1 | Balance | 2 | - | 5 2 | | |
| All but one girls | | 11 | 10 > 9 | All but one girls | - | 1 | 3 > 2 | | |
| All girls | 6 | 11 | (6) ၂ | All girls | 1 | 2 | (0) | | |
| TOTAL | 9 | 11 | 13 | TOTAL | 2 | 3 | 4 | | |
| PAKISTAN | | | | SRI LANKA | | | | | |
| All hours | | 7 | (12)] | | | | 1 | | |
| All but one hove | 4 | 6 | $\binom{12}{10} > 10$ | All but and have | 30 | 33 | (39) > 43 | | |
| Balance | - 5 | - | 8 | Balance | 36 | 40 | 44 51 | | |
| All but one girls | - | 6 | ĕ٦. | All but one girls | - | 43 | 39 1 | | |
| All girls | 4 | (2) | (4) ∫ ° | All girls | 31 | 37 | (49) | | |
| TOTAL | 4 | 7 | 9 | TOTAL | 33 | 42 | 45 | | |

Table A3The percentage of currently married, fecund women who are currently using any method of contraception, bynumber and sex composition of living children

Notes to table A3 appear on p41.

Table A3(cont)

| Composition | Number | of livin | g Children | Composition | Number of living Children | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | | |
| FIJI | | | | INDONESIA | | | | | |
| All boys | 37 | 59 | (62) 61 | All boys | 36 | 48 | 46 1 42 | | |
| All but one boys | - | 43 | 61 01 | All but one boys | _ | 44 | 41 (42 | | |
| Balance | 44 | - | 56 | Balance | 37 | - | 46 | | |
| All but one girls | - | 43 | 55 > 53 | All but one girls | - | 44 | 47 > 45 | | |
| All girls | 38 | 40 | (44) | All girls | 38 | 37 | 38 🖌 | | |
| TOTAL | 41 | 45 | 56 | TOTAL | 37 | 44 | 44 | | |
| KOREA | | | | MALAYSIA | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| ALL DOYS | 58 | 63 | (59) > 62 | All boys | 40 | 40 | (31) > 45 | | |
| All but one boys Balance | - | 5/ | 62 60 | All but one boys | | 47 | 48 j | | |
| All but one girls | | 38 | 42 1 | All but one girls | | 35 | 37 1 | | |
| All girls | 16 | 31 | (21) 39 | All girls | 33 | 37 | (38) | | |
| TOTAL | 41 | 50 | 54 | TOTAL | 37 | 41 | 43 | | |
| PHILIPPINES All boys All but one boys Balance All but one girls All girls TOTAL COLOMBIA All boys | 48 - - 38 46 | 51 52 - 47 49 50 | $ \begin{array}{c} 43\\51\\55\\51\\45\end{array}\right\} 49\\50\\52\\50\\52\\50*\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55\\55$ | THAILAND All boys All but one boys Balance All but one girls All girls TOTAL PARAGUAY All boys | 46 - 42 - 43 43 | 54 55 - 44 (48) 50 (54) | $(44) \\ 48 \\ 59 \\ 47 \\ 67* \\ 52 \\ 37* \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 43 \\ 4$ | | |
| All but one boys | - | 56 | 56 | All but one boys | - | 55 | 45 | | |
| Balance | 49 | - | 55 | Balance | 56 | - | 37 | | |
| All but one girls | - | 47 | 55 53 | All but one girls | - | 49 | 58 59 | | |
| All girls | 56 | (52) | 47 * ∫ | All girls | 43 | (63) | 62* ∫ | | |
| TOTAL | 52 | 51 | 54 | TOTAL | 52 | 53 | 45 | | |
| PERU | | | | VENEZUELA | | | | | |
| All boys | 35 | 42 | (50) | All boys | 56 | (63) | 65*1 ~. | | |
| All but one boys | - | 41 | 35 | All but one boys | _ | 62 | 64 > ⁶⁴ | | |
| Balance | 45 | - | 39 | Balance | 64 | - | 61 | | |
| All but one girls | - | 40 | 34 \ 35 | All but one girls | - | 51 | 70 68 | | |
| All girls | 39 | 41 | (39)∫ | All girls | 57 | (73) | 57*∫ | | |
| TOTAL | 41 | 41 | 37 | TOTAL | 60 | 60 | 64 | | |

Table A3(cont)

| Composition | Number | of living | g Children | Co | Composition | | Number | Number of liv |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|----|--------|---------------|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | | | | 2 | 2 3 |
| COSTA RICA | | | | | MINICAN REPUBLIC | | | |
| All boys | . 70 | (76) | 71 * \ 77 | Al | ll boys | | 44 | 44 (44) |
| All but one boys | - | 75 | 79 ∫ | AJ | ll but one boys | | - | - 50 |
| Balance | 81 | - | 70 | Ba | alance | | 34 | 34 - |
| All dirls | 74 | (79) | ⁷⁴ > ⁷⁶ | 14 | ll dirls | | 31 | 31 26* |
| j | | () | j | | ; | | | |
| TOTAL | 77 | 78 | 74 | TC | JTAL | | 36 | 36 46 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| MEXICO | | | | PA | ANAMA | | | |
| All boys | 38 | 48 | (34) 39 | Al | 1 boys | | 63 | 63 69 |
| All but one boys | - | 44 | 41 / 55 | Al | 1 but one boys | | - | - 65 |
| Balance | 46 | - | 41 | Ba | alance | | 65 | 65 - |
| All but one girls | - | 38 | 41 > 42 | Al | l but one girls | _ | - | - 68 |
| All girls | 38 | 26 | (48) { | Al | l girls | 61 | _ | L (53) |
| TOTAL | 42 | 41 | 41 | тС | JTAL | 63 | | 66 |
| GUYANA | | | | НА | 171 | | | |
| | _ | | 1 | _ | | | | |
| All boys | 26 | 41 | (42) > 36 | Al | .1 boys | 25 | | (24) |
| All but one boys | - | 30 | 33] | AL | .1 but one boys | | | 19 |
| All but one girls | | 38 | 41 1 20 | Ba ا ۵ | l but one girls | 20 | | - 34 |
| All girls | 31 | (38) | 25* | Al | l girls | 19 | | 22* |
| TOTAL | 32 | 35 | 35 | то | TAL | 24 | | 26 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| JAMAICA | | | | TR | NINIDAD AND TOBAGO | | | |
| All boys | 40 | (26) | 59*\ 10 | Al | 1 bovs | 68 | | (68) |
| All but one boys | - | 37 | 47 2 49 | Al | 1 but one boys | - | | 57 |
| Balance | 51 | - | 51 | Ba | lance | 62 | | - |
| All but one girls | - | 47 | (40) > 44 | Al | l but one girls. | - | | 63 |
| All girls | 42 | (44) | 63*∫ | Al | l girls | 65 | | (46) |
| TOTAL | 46 | 40 | 48 | то | TAL | 64 | | 60 |
| | | | | | | | | |

Figures in brackets, n = 50 or less Figures with asterisks, n = 25 or less

Composition Number of living children Number of living children Composition 2 2 3 4 3 4 LESOTHO KENYA All boys Rate 354 304 309 All boys Rate 232 213 269 910 360 151 Woman years 496 271 102 Woman years 188 267 1011 450 All but 209 164 259 All but Rate 335 Rate -_ one boys Woman years _ 1259 860 one boys Woman years 683 348 Balance 199 352 305 Rate 174 Balance Rate 1149 1256 Woman years 2001 _ Woman years -485 All but All but 327 332 Rate 213 233 Rate ---_ one girls 747 one girls Woman years -1289 713 Woman years _ 348 314 217 446 920 242 240 250 All girls 158 All girls Rate 331 335 Rate Woman years 866 306 207 Woman years 671 196 98 TOTAL TOTAL 348 328 295 Rate 218 214 192 Rate 3080 2423 1897 1381 3214 Woman years 3777 Woman years SENEGAL SUDAN (NORTH) 279 263 281 291 All boys 257 308 All boys Rate Rate Woman years 532 231 103 Woman years 450 219 116 286 284 541 413 All but 278 295 All but 280 285 Rate Rate one boys 649 297 649 438 Woman years _ one boys Woman years _ Balance Rate 307 264 Balance Rate 293 274 _ _ 511 950 _ Woman years 917 Woman years 634 251 All but Rate 284 287 All but Rate 261 -one girls Woman years ----683 395 one girls Woman years ---611 303 259 28.2 513 403 275 All girls Rate 296 291 288 All girls Rate 293 266 265 118 557 169 100 Woman years 564 Woman years TOTAL 304 275 270 TOTAL Rate 285 280 279 Rate Woman years 2013 1828 1565 Woman years 1957 1648 1450 JORDAN SYRIA 357 333 328 All boys 348 376 203 All boys Rate Rate 434 595 202 Woman years 204 89 316 Woman years 148 284 549 772 All but 347 313 All but Rate 319 303 Rate _ one boys Woman years _ 604 460 one boys Woman years 787 624 Balance Rate 397 ----343 Balance Rate 375 _ 294 818 613 Woman years 1028 -772 Woman years All but 395 All but 348 Rate 356 Rate 280 one girls _ _ Woman years 620 352 one girls Woman years 865 457 357 284 432 536 All girls 374 407 360 All girls 424 349 Rate Rate 304 Woman years 421 221 80. Woman years 467 206 79

Rate

Woman years

381

1673

371

1649

337

1594

TOTAL

Rate

Woman years

378

2090

340

2060

288

2080

TOTAL

42

Table A4Marital fertility rates per 1000 women years of exposure, averaged for five years preceding survey by number and
sex composition of living children five years previously

Table A4(cont)

| Composition | | <u>Number</u> 2 | of livin 3 | g children 4 | Composition | Composition | | | Number of living children 2 3 4 | | | |
|----------------------|--|--------------------|---------------|---|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|--|--|
| BANGLADESH | 99 (1997) - 201 - 201 (201 - 2 | | | | NEPAL | | | | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 256 1081 | 246 509 | 200 186 175 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 235 994 | 207 515 | 107 126 185 | | | |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 218 1341 | $170 \int 1025$ | All but One boys | Rate Woman years | - - | 198 1242 | 205 633 507 633 | | | |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 242 1931 | - | 203 1214 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 241 2077 | - | 202 767 | | | |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 236 1269 | 189 741 198 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 243 1009 | 184 555 186 | | | |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 256 933 | 2 38 38 0 | $257 \int 849$ | All girls | Rate Woman years | 261 1016 | 257 348 | $\begin{array}{c}198\\92\end{array} \int \begin{array}{c}647\\\end{array}$ | | | |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 249 3945 | 231 3499 | 192 3088 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 245 4087 | 221 3114 | 192 2047 | | | |
| | | | | т. | | | | | | | | |
| PAKISTAN | | | | | SRI LANKA | | | | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 262 856 | 200 372 | 257 176 230 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 195 1110 | 134 539 | 169 195 152 | | | |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 229 969 | $223 \\ 635 $ 811 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 155 1447 | 148 8 23 | | | |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 306 1617 | - | 236 971 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 190 2108 | - | 140 1257 | | | |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 292 985 | 245 550 244 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 168 1351 | 143 780 137 | | | |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 309 580 | 281 300 | $\begin{array}{c} 237 \\ 82 \end{array} \int \begin{array}{c} 632 \\ \end{array}$ | All girls | Rate Woman years | 195 1075 | 193 478 | 112 187 967 | | | |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 294 3053 | 254 2626 | 236 2414 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 193 4293 | 161 3815 | 143 3242 | | | |
| FIJI | | | | | INDONESIA | | | | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 197 695 | 182 374 | 186 177 175 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 188 1552 | 199 612 | $181 \\ 237 \\ 164$ | | | |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 179 924 | 171 561 738 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 166 1842 | 161 1052 | | | |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 196 1427 | - | 146 752 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 177 3106 | - | 153 1604 | | | |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 170 993 | 160 536 158 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 164 1843 | 156 1071 161 | | | |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 252 702 | 265 275 | 148 5 644 108 5 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 193 1544 | 188 655 | 178 280 1351 | | | |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 210 2824 | 185 2566 | 160 2134 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 184 6202 | 172 4952 | 159 4244 | | | |

Table A4 (cont)

| Composition | | Number of living children 2 3 4 | | | Composition | | Number of living children 2 3 4 | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|--|
| KOREA | | | Maria 4 | | MALAYSIA | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 186 973 | 110 502 | 91 231 71 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 222 1091 | 153 393 | 124 177 159 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 115 1672 | $66 \int 1170$ 939 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 163 1367 | 167 5 944 767 5 |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 203 1711 | - | 71 1431 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 191 1952 | - | 153 1278 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 183 1214 | 138 846 158 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - - | 186 1347 | 196 855 199 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 278 753 | 258 364 | $245 \\ 192 $ 1038 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 226 846 | 215 349 | 216 148 1003 |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 215 3437 | 150 3752 | 96 3639 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 207 3889 | 176 3456 | 169 3225 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| PHILIPPINES | 3 | | | | THAILAND | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 269 1513 | 215 606 | 296 344 204 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 208 656 | 203 310 | 186 137 156 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 245 2184 | 180 1321 1665 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 160 930 | $\frac{147}{452} \int \frac{589}{589}$ |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 263 2720 | - | 194 1733 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 199 1282 | - | 141 669 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 232 2051 | 201 1051 208 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 162 762 | 160 463 160 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 255 1249 | 299 474 | $242 \\ 220 $ 1271 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 191 603 | 226 260 | 160 572 109 572 |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 263 5482 | 241 5315 | 201 4669 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 199 2541 | 174 2262 | 152 1830 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| COLOMBIA | | | | | PARAGUAY | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 225 511 | 144 167 | 203 59 150 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 159 498 | 147 197 | 102 59 192 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 189 772 | 140 J 388 329 J 388 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 165 594 | $212 \int 333$ |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 185 933 | - | 171 497 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 203 945 | - | 187 423 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 167 624 | 139 295 140 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 182 506 | 175 177 219 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 226 473 | 168 197 | 143 84 379 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 240 375 | 148 128 | 316 79 |

Woman years 375 128

197 1012

167

1425

Rate 199 Woman years 1818

TOTAL

Rate 206 Woman years 1917

175 1760

155

1264

TOTAL

Table A4(cont)

| Composition | | Number of living children 2 3 4 | | | Composition | | Number of living children 2 3 4 | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|--|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| PERU | | | | | VENEZUELA | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 243 881 | 212 485 | 193 212 201 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 210 418 | 210 152 | 163 49 181 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 211 1315 | 203 909 697 909 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 193 543 | $ 184 \int 354 \\ 305 \int 354 $ |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 249 1934 | - | 242 986 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 209 867 | - | 171 369 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 231 1389 | 204 638 205 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 184 408 | 193 275 201 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 285 956 | 244 465 | $209 \int 827$ 189 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 214 434 | 245 188 | 250 £ 319 44 £ |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 257 3771 | 223 3654 | 217 2722 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 211 1719 | 200 1291 | 184 1042 |
| COSTA RICA | | | | | DOMINICAN F | REPUBLIC | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 164 506 | 183 218 | 102 108 130 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 256 211 | 237 152 | 130 69 150 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 119 619 | 141 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 206 384 | $\frac{156}{231}\int 300$ |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 151 1058 | - | 91 506 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 230 482 | - | 2 <i>5</i> 8 329 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 125 585 | $\left. \begin{array}{c} 163\\ 374\\ \end{array} \right\} 158$ | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 252 369 | 232 310 216 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 155 393 | 118 187 | 114 J 418 | All girls | Rate Woman years | 258 295 | 232 138 | $\begin{array}{c}149\\74\end{array}\right) \begin{array}{c}384\\\end{array}$ |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 155 1957 | 130 1609 | 124 1330 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 244 988 | 230 1043 | 210 1013 |
| MEXICO | | | | | PANAMA | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 274 934 | 268 447 | 327 162 240 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 221 542 | 115 3 2 1 | 168 131 144 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 239 1299 | 221 5 895 733 5 | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | 2 | 149 797 | $\frac{137}{388}\int 519$ |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| one boys | Woman years | - | 1299 | 733 J | one |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------|------|-------------|------|
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 274 1874 | Ξ | 230 1008 | Bala |
| All but | Rate | - | 286 | 232 | A11 |
| one girls | Woman years | - | 1116 | 777 218 | one |
| All girls | Rate | 323 | 263 | 135 910 | All |
| | Woman years | 743 | 48 2 | 133 J | |
| TOTAL | Rate | 284 | 262 | 229 | TOTA |
| | Woman years | 3551 | 3344 | 2813 | |

| boys | Rate Woman | years | 221 542 | 115 3 2 1 | 168 131 | 144 |
|-------|---------------|-------|------------|---------------------|------------|-----|
| | | | | | ~ | |
| but | Rate | | - | 149 | 137 | 213 |
| boys | Woman | years | - | 797 | 388 / | |
| nce | Rate | | 194 | _ | 162 | |
| | Woman | years | 1098 | - | 616 | |
| but | Rate | | _ | 146 | 137 \ | |
| airle | Woman | VAare | _ | 727 | 264 | |
| 91113 | WOman | years | - | 131 | 304 | 140 |
| girls | Rate | | 171 | 146 | 148 | 472 |
| | Woman | years | 491 | 253 | 108 ノ | |
| L | Rate | | 196 | 142 | 150 | |
| - | Woman | | 2121 | 2100 | 1007 | |
| | woman | years | 2131 | 2108 | 1607 | |

45

Table A4(cont)

| Composition | | Number 2 | of living 3 | g children 4 | Composition | | Number 2 | of living 3 | children 4 |
|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------|---|
| GUYANA | | | | | HAITI | | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 251 374 | 182 187 | 136 118 176 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 267 258 | 277 128 | 364 44 251 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | | 178 605 | $\frac{189}{349}\int \frac{467}{5}$ | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 217 391 | $\begin{array}{c} 223 \\ 179 \end{array} \right) \begin{array}{c} 223 \\ 223 \end{array}$ |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 244 796 | - | 1.43 482 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 213 649 | - | 263 310 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 185 531 | $\left.\begin{array}{c}162\\339\end{array}\right\} 167$ | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 199 435 | 151 179 174 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 249 433 | 230 187 | $\begin{array}{c}184\\98\end{array}\int \begin{array}{c}437\\\end{array}$ | All girls | Rate Woman years | 214 332 | 226 157 | 282 39 218 |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 247 1603 | 187 1510 | 162 1386 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 225 1239 | 218 1111 | 234 751 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| JAMAICA | | | | | TRINIDAD & | TOBAGO | | | |
| All boys | Rate Woman years | 180 500 | 232 138 | 126 103 127 | All boys | Rate Woman years | 156 477 | 109 196 | 80 99 83 |
| All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 173 571 | $ \begin{array}{c} 127\\251 \end{array} $ | All but one boys | Rate Woman years | - | 101 573 | 85 274 5 373 |
| Balance | Rate Woman years | 192 749 | - | 182 428 | Balance | Rate Woman years | 120 1100 | - | 87 559 |
| All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 191 413 | 231 251 214 | All but one girls | Rate Woman years | - | 138 510 | 73 341 81 |
| All girls | Rate Woman years | 162 413 | 124 105 | $\begin{array}{c}103\\39\end{array}\right) \begin{array}{c}290\\\end{array}$ | All girls | Rate Woman years | 187 424 | 139 152 | $ \begin{array}{c} 114 \\ 87 \end{array} \right) \begin{array}{c} 428 \\ \end{array} $ |
| TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 181 1662 | 182 1227 | 172 1072 | TOTAL | Rate Woman years | 143 2001 | 119 1431 | 84 1360 |